Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics by Plott, Charles R.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 
Char l es P l o t t  
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 405
September 1981 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION . . , 1 
I .  EXPER IMENTAL ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 3 
I I .  LABORATORY MARKET DETA I L S .  8 
A. Market Crea t io n .  . . . 
B .  Exp e r imental Procedures .  
C .  P erfo rmanc e Measures . 
I I I .  COMPETITIVE MARKET MODELS . 
A. Auc t io n  Markets  . .
B .  Nego t ia t ed Prices . 
C .  Pos ted Pr ices . 
I V .  MONOPOLY . 
A. Va r iable  Supply .  
B .  F ixed Supply 
v. OLIGOPOLY.
A .  Oral Auc t ion Markets
B .  Pr iva tely Nego t ia t ed 
c. Pos ted Prices . 
D.  Markets  with Adva nc e 
P r ic e  Pro tec t ion 
V I .  DEFENSE OF EXPERIMENTS 
VI l. CLOS I NG REMARKS . 
APPENDIX . 
FOOTNOTES . 
REFERENCES 
Prices .  
No t if ica t io n  a nd 
9 
14 
1 6  
19 
19 
26 
28 
33 
33 
37 
39 
41 
4 7  
4 8  
60 
64 
71 
7 6  
81 
83  
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 
Cha rles  R .  P lo t t  
Ca l i fornia I ns t i tu t e  o f  Techno logy 
The i n t roduc t ion of labora tory exper imen ta t ion in  
economics was mo t iv a t ed by t heor ies of  ind u s t r ia l  orga niza t io n  
a n d  performance .  The  f i r s t  publ ished market  exper imen ts were 
t ho s e  of E.  H.  Chamberlin  (1948). H e  explored the  beha v ioral
c ha ra c t e r i s t ic s  of  mar ke t s  he d esc r i b ed as  b e ing " pu r el y" but  no t 
" per fec t l y" compet i t ive and he t hought tha t the  p r inc ipl es o f  
monopo l i s t ic comp et i t io n  woul d  b e  mor e  usef ul than t h e  t ex tbook 
theory of d emand and supply in  expl a i ning the o bserved b ehavior. 
Hogga t t  (1959) focused o n  marke ts w i th three con� e t i tors a nd 
prov ided the f ir s t  exper imental  evidence that  the  Courno t mod el might 
be a reasonably  accura t e  d escr i p t io n  of behav ior . Ol igopoly and 
bila teral monopoly mo t iva ted the c lass ic work of Foura ker a nd S i egel 
(1963) which in t roduced several of the  t echniques s till  u s ed today . 
The f ield o f  experimen t a l  e�o nom i cs has exper ienced 
subs tan t ial  evolu t io n  d u r in g  the i n tervening twen ty- f ive year s .  
Exper imen tal  t echniques have b ecome somewha t standard i z ed .  The 
art o f  pos ing ques t ions , wh ich make exper imen ts r eleva n t  for the  
profess ion i n  general , ha s b ecome ref ined . Many exper imen t s  have 
been condu c t ed and uniform i ties of behavior a re being r ecognized . 
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This paper is a n  a t t emp t to provide a n  introduc t io n  to the  methods 
and an assessment of available resu l t s  which might b e  useful to 
s t udents of indust r ial organ iza t i o n .  
Th e paper h a s  seven s e c t  Lons . Sec t ions one and two add r ess 
some methodu l o g i<'<ll issues . Sec t io n  one  iden t i f ies the nature of 
quest ions answerab l e  by experimen t at ion in r el a t ion to the b road 
f ield o f  indu s t r ial o rganiza t io n .  Sec t io n  two o u t l ines some o f  the  
s t ep-by- s t ep d e t a il s  of  l abora tory p ro c ed u r es . 
Sec t ions three through f ive s ummar ize exp e r imen tal resu l t s .  
I n  sec t ion three markets w i t h  several par t i c ipan t s  a r e  analyzed 
and compared t o  a comp e t i t iv e  mod el . S ec t io n  four summa r i zes mo nopo ly 
resul t s .  Sec t io n  f ive , wh ich is  t h e  l a rges t ,  deals with  o l i gopo l y .  
Thi s  o rgan iza t io n  o f  t h e  ma t erial i s  n a t u r a l  f rom t h e  po i n t  o f  view o f  
t r ad i t ional theory . I t  is no t necessa r il y  natural  f rom t he po i n t  o f  
v iew o f  resul t s .  A s  will  become ev ident f rom t he fo llowing pages , 
market  ins t i t u t ions have a subs tan t ia l  influence on perfo rmance and 
this  influence  sometimes ou twe ighs the impo r tance of indus t r ia l  concen-
t ra t io n  and rela t ive f i rm s i z e .  Co nsequen t l y ,  o n  o c casion i t  is easier 
to orga n i z e  and summa r iz e  resul t s  accord ing to ma r�e t  ins t i tu t ions as
o ppo sed to numbers , s iz e ,  o r  o ther economic paramet ers . 
The s ix t h  s ec t ion o u t l i nes s everal common c r i ti c isms o f  
exp erim ental  methods . The recent  explos i on o f  pro fessional i n t eres t 
in experimental  me thods r e f l ec t s ,  i n  par t ,  a recogn i t ion tha t these 
a nd o ther t rad i t ional c r i t i c isms of  experimental methods can  be 
avoided by proper research designs and by plac ing proper qual i f ic a t i ons 
o n  conc lusions . 1�e sec t ion deals d i rec tly w i t h  such pro b lems . 
I. EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 
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Experimental methods provide a source of shared experience 
for scholars who are developing and evaluating theories about complicated 
naturally occurring processes. While laboratory processes are simple 
in comparison to naturally occurring processes, they are real processes 
in the sense that real people participate for real and substantial profits 
and follow real rules in doing so. It is precisely because they are real 
that they are interesting. General theories must apply to special cases, 
so models believed to be applicable to complicated naturally occurring 
processes should certainly be expected to help explain what occurs in 
simple, special-case laboratory markets, Theories which do not apply 
to the special cases are not general theories and thus cannot be 
advocated as such. 
Laboratory data become relevant to the extent that questions 
can be posed which make the study of special cases relevant. It may 
not be possible to learn about complicated processes directly by 
recreating them in a laboratory. General Motors, with all its size and 
institutional complexity, cannot be recreated many times for the 
convenience of those who wish to know what might have happened had one 
of its features been altered. Still, one might be able to learn something 
about competing models of a complicated process by gaining experience 
with their accuracy in simple cases. Circumstances in which models tend 
to be less reliable can be identified and, to the extent that the 
predictions of a model are accurate over a wide range of laboratory 
circumstances, one gains some confidence in their accuracy when applied to 
the more complicated, naturally occurring circumstances. 
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The special cases reviewed here are those which have been of 
importance to industrial organization theorists. Figure l helps place 
them in a proper context by showing diagranunatically how the experimental 
questions are related to those of more traditional concern. The flow of 
the theory and the methodological perspective is consistent with that 
developed by Scherer (1971, pp. 3-7) . The diagram is taken from Scherer 
with a few changes imposed to highlight the particular links which 
experimentation has been used to explore. Variables which contribute 
to the nat•tre of market demand, costs, the psychological makeup of consumers, 
production technology as dictated by the physical properties of the commodity 
and engineering and management knowledge, resource availability, etc. are 
listed in the category of "basic conditions." Traditional theory provides 
an analysis of how the basic conditions tend to influence industrial 
structure (the number and size of firms, cost structures, degree of inte­
gration, etc.). This influence is represented by the dark arrow. The 
theory then continues to explore how industrial structure when combined 
with principles of economic behavior dictate conduct and performance. 
Within this framework the special cases explored with laboratory 
tools can best be identified by adding another category drawing variables 
from both the traditional conduct category and the basic conditions category. 
These variables are those which characterize the market institutional environ­
ment. They are the rules and organizational structures which govern pricing 
and purchase decisions. In some cases they might be identified as aspects 
of managerial style and thus placed in the basic conditions category. In 
other cases they may be identified as aspects of the general marketing 
strategies of firms and thus be listed as part of conduct (e.g., price posting). 
FIGURE l 
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S t ill , in o t her cases they are  d i c t a t ed by sou r c es ex t ernal to the  
industry  such  as  governmental regula tory pol ic i es o r  a s  in the  case o f  
the secu r i t ies indu s t r y  by the  pol ic i es o f  another i ndus try ( e . g . ,  t h e  
s to c k  exc hanges ) which spec ializes in  provid ing mar ke t ing services . 
Five prominent forms o f  market  i ns t i t u t ions have b een s tud i ed 
in the  experimen t al l i terature : ( a )  auc t ion ma rke t s , ( b )  po s ted b irl 
( o f f e r )  ma rkets , (c) nego t ia ted p r i c e  ( telepho ne) markets, ( d )  markets
with p r i c e  pro t e c t io n  and advance no t i c e  polic ies . A f i f th ,  sea l ed b id 
(o f fe r )  marke t s , w ill also be b r i e fly examined here a s  a spec ial case 
of a s ingle sell e r  arrangemen t .
Actually, the  l is t i ng o f  only f ive d i f f erent  t yp es involves an 
oversimpl i f ic a t i o n .  Each o f  t hese types c a n  b e  subd ivided f u r ther i n to 
special t y pes. Auc t io n  market s ,  fo r exampl e, can be e i t her Engl ish o r  
Du tch  ac co rd ing t o  wh e t her the pr ices s ta r t  low and a r e  bid  u p  by 
compe t i t io n  or s ta r t  high and are  r educed u n t il some compe t i to r  accep t s .  
English auc t ions c a n  b e  "double o ral" o r  "one s ided . "  Markets  d i f fe r  
acco rd ing to whether  o r  no t t h e  t erms o f  c o n t ra c t s  are  publ ic and t h e  
sequence i n  wh ich b id s, o f fers, a nd t e rms b ecome known . T h e  poss iLi l i t ies 
are so r ic h  that it som e t imes seems mo r e  a ppropr ia t e  to th ink in  t erms 
of a co n t i nuum ra th er than f ixed classes . Fo r exampl e ,  po s t ed p r ic e  
auc t ions l o o k  v e r y  simila r to " s ealed b id" auc t io ns i f  s ellers mus t 
po s t  prices  wi t ho u t  t he knowl edge o f  o ther prices a nd w i t ho u t the 
abi. l i ty t o  immed ia t ely " adj ust"  p r ices in light of the  compe t i t io n .  
I n  ad d i tion t o  Indu s tr ial  s tructure  a nd t h e  ma rket  ins t i tu t io nal 
environmen t ,  s i tua t ions can d i f f e r  accord ing to the general info rma t io n  
o f  par t ic ipan t s . Agen t s  may o r  may no t be awa re o f  t h e  o p t io ns o r  t he 
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p ayo f f s  o f  o t h e r s .  There may also b e  d i f  f er·ences a bou t t h e  knowl edge 
abou t o thers' know led g e .  So the read er can see tha t rel a t ive to �1at 
one would l i ke to know, the number o f  s tud i e s  covered below is modes t 
indeed . 
Labor a t o ry s tu d ies have focused u po n  how ind ust  r ia1 s true tu re 
a nd ma rket ins t i tu t ions i n f l uence conduc t d e f ined in t erms o f  price  
p a t terns and r esource allo c a t io n  and  a l so how the two c a t egories  
i nfluence per fo rmance d e f ined i n  t erms of  income d is t r ibu t io n  and 
e f f ic i ency ( the d a rk a rrows ) .  The l ink which has no t yet  been explo r ed 
sys t ema t ically ls the i nfluence of market s t ruc ture  on mar ke t  ins t i t u­
t io nal va r iables.  No dou b t  in  t ime this  l ink will r ec eive a t t e n t io n ,  
I t s  impor tance i s  widely r ecogn i z ed b u t  i t  does pose pro b l ems for  
exper imen tal me t hods as  d iscussed in  the  conclud ing sec t i o n .  Neve r t hel ess , 
the  reader slwu l d  be awar e  o f  the l im i t ed scope o f  exis t in g  resul t s  so 
they c a n  be placed in a proper co n t ex t .  
Because labo ra tory s tud i es fo cus upon part icular l i nks , they 
are spec ial cases for  t he general theor ies which expla in all t h e  
intera c t ions , f eedbacks (as  r epresen t ed b y  the  do t t ed lines i n  t h e  
F i gu r e )  a n d  in fl u ences among a l l  t h r e e  groups o f  var iables : indus t r ial 
s tr u c t u r e ,  market  i ns t i t u t io ns, and conduc t .  Wit h in the gene ral theo r y  
c e r t a i n  types o f  indus t r ial s t ruc tures  are  t ho ugh t to d i rec t l y  infl u enc e 
ma rket  ins t i t u t io ns ( ca r tel  organiza t ions, for  exampl e ,  are  t hought to 
be mo r e  l ikely in mar k e t s  with f ew f irms ) and then the market  ins t i tu t ions 
once d eveloped i nduce  f eedback e f f e c t s  which opera t e  to change the
indu s t r ial s t ruc t u r e  ( e . g . ,  f irm s ize) . Thu s, the theory ls appl ied 
to expla in how bo th types of variables wi l l  evolve and, wh i l e  evo l v ing , 
will j o in tly influence market conduc t .  Exper imen t a l  s t ud ies have 
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t ended to use t his las t  link o f  the general t heory as a guide  to wha t 
to loo k  f o r  in the b ehavio r o f  s imple indus t r ies ( r ela t ive to the 
naturally occu r r ing ind us tr i e s ) . In mos t  experimental  wo r k  the bas i c  
cond i t ions , the indus t r ial s t ructure ,  a nd the  ma rket  ins t i t u t ions a r e  
all exogenously d e t e rmined treatmen t va r iables . All are  held cons t a n t  
while the  resu l t ing conduc t ls obs erved s o  t h e  j o in t  influences o f  
ind u s t r ial s t ru c t u r e  and mar ke t  i ns t i t u t ions o n  conduc t and perfo rmance 
can b e  ascerta ined and unders tood in t erms of the theo r i es a s  applied 
to those c ir c ums tanc e s .  
I I .  LABOHATORY MARKET DETAILS 
The o nly way to f ully und ers tand how labora tory markets a r e  
conduc t ed i s  by personally condu c t ing several exper iments und e r  t h e  
supe rvis ion  o f  an exper ienced experiment al is t .  I t  i s  easy t o  crea t e  
a r eal ma rket  a s  desc r ibed i n  the f irs t paragraphs b elow .  T h e  d i f f icult  
part  is  c r ea t ing a market  t ha t  d emo ns tr a t es a po i n t  which w ill hold 
upon r eplica tion in o ther subj e c t  pools and by o ther exper imen ters . 
Because we know now t ha t  ma rke t  b ehavior is sens i t ive to ind ividual 
preferences and ins t i tu t io nal a rrangemen t s ,  the  expe r imenter mus t  
avo id contam ina t ing these va r ia bles w i t h  poorly d eveloped p ro c ed u r es . 
1�e second subsec tion covers some o f  the  procedural d e ta ils . The 
f inal pa ragra phs of the sec t io n  elabora t e  on the measures used to 
evalu a t e  t he ma rke t s .  
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A. Ma rket Crea t ion 
1�e key economic va ri ables are  ind i vidual p re f e renc e s ,  the 
value ind ividuals pla c e  o n  o bjec t s ,  and the form of the ma r ke t  
o rgan izat ion wi t h in wh ich buyer s  and sc] l e rs int erac t .  Prefen•nces
are induced by a spec ial appli c a t io n  o f  derived d emand t heory cal l ed 
induced pref erence t heory ( Sm i t h  197 6 b ;  Plo t t  1979) . Buy e rs make 
money by buy ing f rom s ellers and resel ling to the experiment e r  a ccord i ng 
to a p red e t erm ined redemp t io n  value sched u l e .  The d i ff erence be tween 
the purchase p r i c e  and red emp t io n  value is pro f i t  wh ich is t he buyer' s 
to keep.  Sell ers  make a pro f i t  by purcha s i ng units f rom t he exper imen ter 
a t  a predetermined cost schedule and s elling to the  buyer s .  The 
d i f ference is  a p ro f i t  which the seller keeps . In add i t ion to these 
p ro f i t s ,  par t ic i pan t s  frequen tly receive a small comm is s io n  f o r  eac h  
trade.  The role o f  t he commiss ion will be expla ined below.  
The idea is  decep t ively s impl e .  I f  an  ind ividual p r e fers 
more money to less ; if  an  ind ividual has no a tt i tude toward t he commo d i ty 
o r  s i tu a t io n  o t her than the  advantages c reated by po t e n t i a l  resale ; 
and , i f  t he i nd ividual f u l ly und e r s t ands the terms o f  resal e ,  then the  
redemp t io n  schedule is  a l im i t  p r i c e  schedule fo r the  ind ividual.  
Figu r e  2 c o n t ains  an example of wha t buyers typic ally s e e .  The
red emp t io n  value o f  the f i r s t  uni t t his  ind ividual purcha s es d u r ing 
a period is  Jn row one . The p u r chase p r ice is entered i n  row two 
and the  p ro f i t  and pro f i t plus commissio n  are ent ered i n  r ows three and 
fou r  respec t ive l y .  As can be seen , these entries a r e  mad e  for  
each purchase during a per lod .  
Neglect ing the  comm is s io n  for a momen t ,  the incent ives o f  
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FIGURE 2 
--------- ---- -
Redemp t ion Values Costs 
Indiv idual Buyer Numb er --- Ind iv idua1 Seller Numb er ---
Perio d  Per iod ------
Unit  Row Value U ni t  Row 
Val u e  
-
1 1s t uni t red emption value $2 . 00 1 �_e1ling price f--
1 2 
pu rc hase p r i c e  1 2 
co s t  o f  1s t unit  $ . 25 
3 profi t  3 pro f i t  
4 oro f i t  + 1 5¢ commis s io n  4 pro f i t  + 1 5¢ commiss ion
5 2nd u n i t  r edemption value $ 1 .  so 'i se11 ine nrice 
2 6 
purchase nrice 2 
6 cos t  o f  2nd uni t $ . 7 5 
_]_ _JJ_ro f i t  7 p ro f i t  
8 pro f i t  + 15¢ commission 8 pro f i t  + 1 5¢ commiss ion -
9 3 rd unit  redemp t ion value $1. 00 9 s elling price  
3 1 0  
purchase price  3 
1 0  cos t o f  3rd uni t $ 1 .  0 0  
ll prof i t  11 pro f i t  
12 prof  i t  + 1 5¢ commission 12 pro f i t  + 1 5¢ commis s io n
1 3  4 th u n i t  redemp tion value $ . 7 5  1 3  s elling pr ice 
4 
1 4  p u rchase orice 4 1 4  
cos t o f  4 th unit  $ 1 . 25 
15  p ro f  i t  L5 pro f i t  
16 pro r i t  + 1 5¢ commission 16 pror i t  + 1 5¢ co1mntss ion -
1 7  5 th u n i t  redempt ion value $ . 25 1 7  selling p r  ice  
5 1 8
 p u rc hase £'.!_ice 5 
18 cos t o f  5 t h  unit $1. 7 5 
1 9  p ro f i t  1 9  pro f i t  
20 p ro f i t  + ] 5¢ commissio n 20 pro f i t  + 15¢ commission -
LTo tal eer iod earni ngs To tal per iod earnings 
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1 ind iv idual 1 can be represented by a total  r evenue func t ion R ( xi ) 
ind ica t ing the r evenue genera t ed by a quan t i ty o f  purchases x i . 
1�e ma gnitude R i ( xi ) - R
i
( x i + 1), the red emp ti on value for  the
(xi + 1) th unit can be seen a s  a l im i t  price func t io n .  It is
nega t ively sloped a s  shown but  of  course the slope as  well as  the 
pa t tern of such red emp t ion va lue funct ions across agen ts are parameters 
under the control of the exper�IBnt e r .  Und e r  comp e t i t ive assump t ions 
this r ed emp t io n  va lue sched u l e  is the ind ivid ual ' s  i nverse d emand 
sched u l e .  Thus the expe r imen t e r ,  by vary ing these pa rameters , can 
con t ro l d emand elas t i c i t y ,  concentra t ion o f  buyer s ,  and o ther magn i-
tudes of economic interes t .  
Incent ives o f  suppliers a r e  induc ed i n  a s imila r  manner .  
Aga i n ,  reference to Figure 2 d emons trat es the technique for  a typical
ind ividual suppl i e r .  Row two contains t h e  co s t  o f  the f i r s t  u n i t  sol d .  
Th is c o s t  is  incu rred a t  the t ime o f  t h e  sal e .  When t h e  sale  is  made ,  
the seller  enters t h e  sell ing p r ic e  i n  t h e  f ir s t  row and then calcul a t es 
the p ro f i t s  and p ro f i t  p lus commiss ion a s  d ir ec t ed by rows three and 
fou r .  The p ro f i t  f rom o ther sales mad e  d u r ing th is  period  a r e  s im ilarly 
ca l cul a ted . ,i Thus , ind ividual i has a cos t func t ion C ( xi ) '  a nd the
i i marg inal cos t ,  C ( x
i
) - C ( x
i
+ 1 ) ,  has a lready been calcu l a t ed for 
the ind i v idual a s  shown on the forms . These func t ions , the ind ivid ual 
shapes , a nd the d is t r i bu t io n  o f  the cos t functions a c ross  sellers , 
are control l ed b y  the exper imen t e r .  Supply c a n  b e  e l a s t ic o r  
inela s t i c .  l'n t ry can h e  easy n r  d i f f icul t .  The numbe r  o f  sellers  
can be l a rge o r  small. Al l such  parame t e rs a r e  su bjec t to experimen tal 
contro l .  
Whether  an ind iv idua l l s  s hown the redemp t ion value  for  
a l l  p e r iods at  one  t ime o r  just  for  one per iod a t  a t ime d i f f ers 
accord ing to the purpose of the exper imen t .  I n  many cases the 
ind iv idual knows h is/her own red emp t ion val ues for  all  p e r iods 
at  the beginning o f  the experiment ,  b u t  there a r e  impo r ta n t  
1 2  
exce p t ions . I f  ind ividual costs o r  r ed emp t ion values a r e  chang ing 
each p e r iod , for examp l e ,  these woul d  b e  r evealed one a t  a t im e  j us t  
before a period b egan . I n  a lmos t a l l  experiments the ind ividual 
knows only h is/her redemp t ion value and no th ing about the red emp t ion 
value o f  o t hers . 1 The procedures a nd i ns t ru c t ions are  d e s igned to
keep t h is type of  informa t ion p r iva t e. 
Commiss ions a r e  no t always used . I t  is known t ha t  i nd ividuals 
t end no t to trade  units  unless ther e is some advantage for  doing so . 
For example , indiv idual buyers (sellers)  will  no t buy ( s el l )  units  
at  a p r ice equal  to the r ed emp tion value (marginal co s t )  unless  there  
is a small commiss ion . The func t io n  o f  t h e  commission is thus to 
induce ma rg inal trades by overcoming wha t seems to be a small t ransa c t ions 
cos t (Plo t t  and Smi th , 1 97 8 ) . Subj e c t s  are  i ns t r u c t ed no t to tra d e  a t  
p r ices which are  above ( below) redemp t io n  values, t hus avo id ing the 
p rob lem nf  inc l ud ing the comm iss io n a s  part of the l im i t  p r i c e .  Mo re 
recent  expe r imenta t io n  has dropped the u s e  of  commission and avo ided 
the "mnrginal tn1de" p roblem by adjusting the market pa ramelers to 
a l l ow for  some gilins f rom t rade a t  the margin. Care musl be exerc lzed 
however . Mod e l  p red ict ions a re usually b as ed on an impl i c i t  hypo thl'sis 
tha t  marg ina l  t rnd es w il l  be made and somet i mes can ea s i l y  be r ej ected 
on the basis o f  d a t a  gener a t ed in ma r ke t s  w i t ho u t  commiss ions . 
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At  t h e  top o f  Figure 2 you will  no t ice a per i od ind i ca to r .  
Experimen tal marke t s  a r e  usually cond u c t ed over a series o f  periods 
or " t rad ing days . "  The l ength  o f  a perio d  is  normal l y  f rom f ive to  
f i f t een m inu t es depend ing upon the vo lume of  ac t iv i ty anticipa t ed . 
Unless the conwod i ty has some expl i c i t  p ropert ies o f  an asset  wh ich 
has a l i f e  over t im e  ( Forsy t h e ,  Pal f r ey , Plo t t ,  for thcoming ) , each 
p e r iod is  1 ike  an independ e n t  trad ing day with d emand s ,  suppl i es , p ro f i t  
po tent i a l , e tc . , ind epend ent o f  ( b u t  po s s ibly i d e n t ical wit h )  those o f  
prev ious period s .  I t  i s  well es tabl ished that  trad ing pa t t er ns change 
as the market days a r e  repl ica t ed . No good mod e l  o f  th is c hange exists  
bu t ,  as  wil l b e  d emonstrated  b elow , t h e  market  equ il ibr a t io n  process 
occurs with  the repl ica t io n  of market p er io d s . 
The market ins t i tu t ional o r ganizat ion ha s b een an important  
t rea tment  var iabl e .  The mechanics o f  how buyers a nd sellers g e t  
together can subs t a n t ia l ly influence the general marke t p e r fo rma nc e ,  
Tha t i s ,  for  t h e  same und erly ing incent ives , t h e  ma rket per forma nc e 
is affec t ed by a change o f  i ns t i tu t ions . For examp l e ,  the o r iginal 
exp eriments by Chamberlin ( 1948) had the agen ts c ircula t ing in a ronm 
and priva tely nego t ia ting price  when a buyer or seller  was con ta c t ed . 
In some o f  these marke ts , t erms o f  t rad e were puhl i c l y d i s p l ayed on 
the blackboard while in o t hers they were no t ,  Th is ma r ke t  behaves 
much d i f ferently  tha n ,  say , an o ral double auc t io n  in which all b id s  
( o f fers) a r e  o ral ly t end ered , pub l ic l y  d i splayed w i t h  only one 
outstand ing ( t he l as t ,  the bes t ,  e tc . ) bid ( o f fer)  open a t  any
po in t in t ime .  Sel l e rs (buyers) a r e  f r ee to accep t an o u t s tand ing 
b id (offer) by a pu b !  ic, verb;tl i nd ic a t ion .  Thus In the o ra l  double 
auc t io n ,  all  b id s ,  o f fers , and contracts  are  pub l ic info rma t io n ,  
and t h i s  is  no t t h e  case i n  t h e  Chambed i n  o rganiza t ions . 
B .  Exper imental Procedures 
The experimen tal pro c edu res are  one of the mos t  impo r tunt 
aspec t s  of an experiment but t h ey can be ea s i l y  overlooked . Fo r 
examp l e ,  the wo rd i ng o f  the ins t ruc t ions and the fo rma t o f  the 
ins t ruc t ions in mos t  exp e r imen t s  have evo lved so tha t very l i t tl e  
abou t t hem i s  a r b i trary o r  has no t been subj ec t ed t o  subs tantial  
scrutiny .  The  ex tr eme ca re is  d ic t a t ed by two overrid ing concerns . 
F i rs t ,  the procedu res nrus t  be f o rmula ted so that  o ther researchers 
when followfog them will  b e  a b l e  to r eplicate  repo r t ed resu l ts . 
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The hea r t  o f  the experimen t al me tho d  is r epl ica t ion and the p ro c edures 
embody the opera t ional content of many of the parameters and e xp e r i­
mental cond i t ions which , i f  changed , may induce d i ff er en t  resul t s .  
I f  resu l t s  a r e  t o  repl ica t e  w i t h  d i f ferent  subj ec t poo l s  and d i ff e rent 
exper imen ters , then the procedures mus t  b e  care fully cons idered . 
S econd l y ,  there i s  a n  almo s t  perva s ive bel i e f  tha t experimenters 
wil l o r  can influ ence the b ehavio r of  subj ects  by sub t l e  sugges t ion 
abou t  wha t the experimenter wan t s  to d emons t r a t e .  Whether t h is belief  
ls well founded o r  no t is  open  to  ques tion2 b u t ,  regardless of  the
answe r ,  the proced ures mus t  minimize  the po tent ial for  such influences 
if the r esul ts  are to be taken seriously by a l a rge numb e r  o f  peo p l e .  
In rev i ewing t h e  sample ins t ruc t i ons i n  t h e  append i x , the 
reader wil l not i c e  the absence of wo r d s  l ike "compe t i t ion , "  "ma x im izing , "  
" co l l u s ion , "  "coa l l. t io n , "  e t c . , o r  o t her wo rd s which might  suggest to 
the subjc>ct S(lnte t heory nr expe1•talinn on Lill, part of Lile l'Xperi111cnter. 
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The examples used t o  illus tr a t e  accoun t ing conven t ions and p ro f i t  
compu tat ions are s tandard across many d i f ferent exper imen ts . I n  fac t ,  
at t emp ts are made to main tain as much o f  the word ing and exampl es 
ac ross vas tly d i f f er e n t  types o f  experiments ( e . g . , conn i t tees v s .  
market s )  i n  order t o  min imi z e  t h e  l a t itude f o r  theo r ies wh i c h  
seek t o  explain the  r esul ts o f  a par t icular experimental s e r i es 
in t erms of the language us ed i n  the ins truc t ions for that ser i es .  
The procedures can d if fer accord ing t o  the purpo s es o f  
the exper imen t .  For examp l e ,  mar ginal values are d isplayed i n  
Figure 2 as opposed to  to tal values s o  subj ec t s  need no t compu t e  
t h e  f ormer i n  making d e c i s ions . I t  was done for  them. The i nd ividual s 
take tests  at the  end o f  the  ins truc t io n  perio d  to s ee i f  he/she can 
read these tables as hypo thes i zed . A f ter  each of the f irs t s ev eral 
per iod s ,  each ind ividual 1 s account ing i s  checked to see if there  is  
any misund ers tand ing about the  r eward s t ruc ture .  Ques t ions about the 
mechanics o f  calcula t ing pro f its  are welcomed and answered fully and 
openl y .  Y e t ,  if someone asks , "what am I supposed to do?" the
experimen t er reread s t h e  r el evant por t io n  o f  the i ns truc t ions : " th e  
experimen t ers do no t care whe ther o r  how you par t ic ipate s o  l o n g  as 
you s tay wi thin t h e  co n f i nes o f  the rul e s .  11 P resumabl y ,  i f  t h e  capac i ty 
o f  an ind i vidual to und erstand or r ecognize a r eward s truc tur e was a 
var iable to be s tud ied as par t o f  the marke t ,  then all o f  these 
procedures should possibly be changed but tho s e  par t icular variables 
wer e  held cons tan t for mos t of the expe r iments r ev iewed her e .  
Some o f  t h e  p rocedur es are ado p t ed t o  allow ind ividual s as 
much " independence" f rom the social si tua t ion as pos s i b l e .  Soc ial 
16 
secur i ty numbers and names (both  o f  which are used as r ece ipts  for 
the mone tary paymen t s )  are coll ec t ed a f t er the exp er iment  is over . 
Ind iv iduals are paid in p r ivat e so o thers need never know their earn ings . 
When ind ividuals are o bv iously confused o r  are having d if f icul ty wi th 
the inst ruc t ions , e f f o r t s  are mad e to avoid any embarrassmen t .  The 
commo d i ty is never given a nam e ,  or r e ferenc e is never made to a 
" s im ilar" type o f  natural s i tua t io n  in o rd er to avo id giv ing some 
imp r es s io n  about how ind ividual s ar e expec t ed to ac t .  
From a pragma t i c  po i n t  o f  view expe rimental is t s  r eal i z e  that 
t h e ir experimen t s  will b e  c hecked by o ther r es earchers . Such r esearchers 
may have a vested i n teres t in hav ing the r esul t s  no t r epl icat e .  Th is i s  
especial l y  t rue in  f ields  l ike indus t r ial o rganizat ion i n  which t h e  data 
can b ecome par t o f  an  adv isory process . An unambiguous and complete  s e t  
o f  procedures is an impor tant sourc e o f  pro tec t io n .
C .  Perfonnanc e Measures 
Gains f rom exchange in mos t  experimen ts are eas ily iden t i f ied 
and measurab l e .  Pare to o p t imal allocat ions are eas ily obs ervabl e .  I n  
economics expe r iments t h e  system at tai ns an e f f icient alloca t io n  i f  a nd 
o nl y  i f  the  subjec ts as a group max imize the to tal monetary payments
from the exper imen ter . Thus , the rela t ive e f f ic iency o f  sys tems is  
d e ter mined by comparing t he to tal paymen t to sub j ec ts w i t h  the maximwn 
possible to tal paymen t .  
I n  o rd er to d emons t ra t e  how this  measure o f  e f f icienc y is 
r ela ted to ideas of consumers ' p l us  p roducers ' surplus , cons id er F igu r e  J. 
Assume the economy has two d emanders and two suppl iers . The d eman<lers 
are ident ical and each has the r ed emption values shown in Figur e 2 .  The 
FIGLIEE '3 
I 2 
2 . 00 
1. 7 5 -
3 4 
1 2 
1 .  50
1. 25 
'3 4 
I. on l 2 
'3 4 
I 2 
. 7 5  - -
3 4 
.so 
1 2 
. 2 ') 
J 4 
. 
() 3 I, 5 6 7 8 9 10 l J 12 l l JI, 
18 
supp l iers a re al so i d en t ic a l  and each has the marg i nal cos t sched u le In 
Figure 2 .  The ma rket d emand func t ion is o b t a ined by add ing the ( inve r t ed ) 
ind iv idua l l im i t  p r i c e  f unc t ions and the  ma rket supply i s  obta ined by 
add ing the  ( inve r t ed ) ind ivid ual margina l cost  func t ions . As con be seen 
co nsumer plus p rod ucer surplus is max im ized at six un i t s wi th each buyer 
( seller)  buying ( s e l i ng ) t hree ( t hree)  u n i t s .  A q u i c k  c heek i nd ica tes 
t ha t this a l loca t ion also max imizes total subj ec t pro fits  from the 
experimen t .  I f, for examp l e ,  ano ther u n i t  wa s purchased , the subj ect  
payment to the experimenter  (marg inal cos t )  would  exceed experimenter  
payment to  the su bj e c t s  (redemp t ion val u e )  on this  uni t . Total p ro f i t s  
wou l d  thus b e  d e c reased . 
This measure mu s t  be in terp r e t ed with some c a r e .  l n  some 
s t ud ies the commiss ions are  inc l ud ed as p a r t  o f  the measure wh i l e  i n  
t h e  o t h e r  stud i es , they are  no t .  Includ ing them makes the measure 
sens i t iv e  to whe ther o r  no t the  marginal ( zero pro f i t )  trad es a r e  mad e, 
3 thereby captu r ing  one aspec t o f  e f f i c i ency . On the  o ther hand , the  
commiss ion seems to have  no  na tural interpreta t io n  in the wel fare  economic s 
mod el . 
The e f f i c iency measure is a l so sens i t ive to the  shapes 
of t he curves.  Sup po s e, f o r  example ,  the  f i r s t  uni t red emp t ion va l ues
are inc reased by a factor o f  t en and the  f irs t un i t  ma rg i nal costs are 
red uced to zero . Because t hese uni t s w i l l  a l mo s t  surely t ra d e  and they 
now cons t i tu te a large propo r t ion o f  the surplus, the sys tem e f f i c iency 
woul d  inc rease for any expected pa t te rn o f  trad i ng. Thus , by adjus t i ng 
the l evel  o f  the base pro f I t  po t en t ial  w i th intrama rg i na l  un its  tha t 
w i l l  a l mos t  ce>r t n i nly trade, the a bsol u t e  e f f ic iell<'.Y l evel s can b e  
i n f l11enced . 
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A s im i l a r  poss i b i l i ty exists  w i th the a lloca tion o f  redemp t io n  
val ues across individu a l s .  Suppose t h e  two red emp tion values o f  $.75 
were held by a t hird and four th ind ividual  who have t h e  r igh t to buy 
only  the one uni t .  I f  e i ther o f  these two ind ividua l s  make a trade ,
eff ic iency d rops . S ince they have only  one ( inef f ic ie n t )  u n i t  to t rad e ,  
they s tand r eady to t rad e and wi l l  trade should  the p r i c e  ever "wand er" 
down in that  range . These u n i t s  seem to have mor e  opportunity to,be 
t raded than when they a r e  held as  the fourth uni t by the original two 
trade rs .  In the l a t t e r  case ,  inef f ic ient t rad ing can  occur only i f  the 
price wanders low enough a f ter an ind ividual  has t raded three u n i ts. 
Other special  p robl ems with e f f ici ency measures occur in 
the case of uncerta i n t y .  S ince those experimen ts have only a l im i t ed 
r e l evance to the indus t r ial  organiza t ion l i tera tu r e ,  they w i l l no t 
be reviewed here ( see Plo t t  a nd Sunder,  forthcoming) . The important  point  
is that  compar isons of  e f f ic ienc ies across markets w i t h  d if f erent  
economic parame t ers mus t  be t rea ted with  care .  I f  the u nd e r l y i ng 
economic parame ters are  held cons tant  a nd the ins t i tu t ions alone  are  
cha nged, t h e  e f f i c i ency compar i son seems to  have a sol id  bas e .  
III . COMPETITIVE MARKET MODELS 
A .  Auc t ion Marke t s  
The competit ive mod el seems to work the b e s t  when ma rkets 
are 01·gan i zed as o ra l  doub l e  auc t ions .  Ornl  auc t io n  ma rkets are  
charact e r ized by publ ic b id s  ( o f fers) to  buy (se l  I )  un l t s  and the
I reedt>m of any part i cipant tt> accep t  terms which  (s ) he wishes. 
Several V3r ian ts exist depend ing upon the l ength o f  time or c i rcums tances 
und e r  wh ich a b id (offer)  rema i ns outs tand i ng, whe t her the b id ( o f f er)  
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is mad e o ra l l y  or logged through a compu ter , the ro l l  o f  the special i s t ' s
" book , "  e t c . 
The overwhelming resu l t  is tha t these ma rkets converge to Lhe 
compet i t iv e  equ i l i b r ium even w i th very f ew t rad ers . Figu r e  4 i s  typ ic a l
o f  the t ime pat tern  o f  p r ices . Shown there is the price o f  every sal e 
i n  the order  in which i t  occurred . Eac h  period represen t s  a ma r ke t  day 
with  a given d emand and suppl y . The comp e t i t iv e  equ i libr ium is $2 with  
a volume per per iod of  e ight co n t ra c t s .  A s  market days a r e  r ep l icated 
under ident ical  co nd i t ions , pr ices  tend to converge to the comp e t i t ive 
equ i l ibr ium .  E f ficiency l ev e l s  t en d  to  converge to nea r 100 p ercen t .  
I f  a change in  parame ters had occurred , suc h  as  a shi f t  i n  d emand o r  i n  
supply ,  the pr ices would  have converged to t h e  new equ i l i brium a f t er two 
or three p e r iod s .  
As l o ng a s  the indus t r ia l  s tructure has a f ew buyers and sel l er s ,  
these conve rgence and e f f i c iency propert ies appea r t o  b e  independent o f  the 
basic economi c cond i t ions . Dif ferent shapes o f  d emands and sup p l ies as we re 
systema t i c a l l y  e xamined by Smith ( 1962, 1965, 1976a) y i e l d  no subs tant i a l  
d i f ferences . T h e  variat ions explored cove red various cases o f  demand 
el as t i c i t y  and non l inea r i t y ,  In Smith ( 1965) a compl e t e l y  ine l a s t i c  ( in 
the re levant range) demand was used a l ong with a f ixed supp l y  (greater than 
the quan t i ty demanded ) .  In a l l  cases , a f ter a f ew per iod s ,  the ma1·ke t 
per formanc e was c: lose to that pred ic t ed by the compe t i t iv e  mod el, 
Other aspec ts o f  the basic  econom ic cond i t ions have b een 
changed to al low for seasonal i ty (Miller , P lo t t ,  a nd Smi t h  197 7; 
A. W. W i l l iams 197 9; Ho f fman a nd Plo t t  1981 ) ,  m id d l emen (Plo t t  and 
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Uh l  1981 ) ,  <llld o t her f ealures hav ing Lo do with the t ime d i m ensio n
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o f  a commod i ty l i f e .  In a l l  c a s es t h e  comp e t i t ive mod e l  is  a n  accura t e  
pred ic to r o f  market  b ehavio r .  The mod e l ,  when assets a r e  invo lved , mus t 
be a l t er ed to accommoda te ra t ional expec t a t ions ( Forsy the,  Pa l f rey,  and 
Plo t t ,  for thcoming ) and ins ide info rma t io n  as to asset  returns ( P lott 
and Sund e r , for t hcoming) , Plo t t  and Wilde  ( fo r thcoming) and Plo t t  and 
Sunder bo t h  involved uncer ta inty . P lo t t  and Wilde; Fo rsythe ,  Palf r ey 
and Plo t t ;  and G r e t he r ,  Isaac , and Plo t t  (1981) a l so invo lved mul tipl e ,  
int erdepend en t  marke t s .  S t il l  t h e  emp i r ical  gener a l i z at io n  is  t h a t  w i th 
oral doub l e  auc t ions the compet i t ive model is an accur a t e  p r ed ic tor und er 
all per turb a t ions of the bas ic economic cond i t io ns eve n  though only three 
o r  four sellers and / o r  buyers may b e  invol ved . 
Baslc eco nomic cond i t ions do seem to inf luence the d irec t io n  
o f  conver gence t o  equilibrium and thus t h e  d is tr ibution o f  income a nd 
prof i t .  The path  to equilibrium s eems to be f rom above ( b e low) i f  
consumer ' s  ( produc er ' s ) surplus is  gr eater  t h a n  p roducer ' s  (consumer ' s ) 
surplus . Thus , one might expec t that  ma rkets w i t h  r e l a t ively s teep 
d emand s and r easonably f l a t  suppl ies r ecord somewhat  e l eva ted p ro f i t s  
f o r  t h e  sell ers r el a t ive t o  t h e  comp e ti tiv!'! equil ll•rium . These prof i ts 
would acc rue a t  d is equil ibr ium trades and so the phenomenon would also 
b e  accompani ed by fall ing pr ices . I f  the indus try has been c haracter i zed 
by unan t ic ipa ted d emand or supply  s h i f t s ,  prices a nd p ro f i t s  can be 
a f fec ted . Adj us tment to new equ i l ibr iums takes t ime a nd pro f it s  o r  
losses can  c e r ta inly refl ec t d isequilibr ium trades . To d a t e  only 
one s tudy has a t t em p t ed to chara c terize  the dynamic adjus tment path 
( Sm i t h  1965) and the conclus ions f rom this  are  c louded (Nelson 1980) , 
No good t heory o f  a d j us tment e x i s ts and exper imen ta l s tud ies have no t 
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yet  explored the i n f l uence o f  ba s i c  economic cond i t ions on adjus tmen t 
paths suf f ic iently to prov i d e  a ny fur ther genera l iza t ions . 
Figure 5 has been added to show a typical adjus tment path 
fo r an o ral doub l e  auc tion when produc er ' s  surplus is grea ter than 
consumer ' s  surpl us . The pa th is from b e low as pred i c t ed .  I f  the 
rela t ive surpl uses were reversed , the approac h ,  accord ing to cur r en t l y  
accep t ed hypo theses , would b e  f rom above .  The key paramet e r  is  the 
surpluses , however , and no t d emand or  supply slopes , a l t hough in the 
case of l inear func t ions these a re obviously closely r ela t ed .  
Changes in the market i ns t i t ut i o ns are  known t o  i nfluence pri ce 
and p ro f i t  p a t t e rns . Doubl e  auc t ions conduc ted by comput e r  can a f f e c t  the 
speed o f  convergence especially with  inexper ienced p a r t i c ipants (A.  W .  
Williams 1980) . For s ingle uni t  auc t ions d i f f e rences are exh i b ited be tween 
the Dut ch auc t ion, Eng l i s h  auct ion, and s econd price auc t ion , Theo ret ically 
(Nash bidd ing hypothes is)  the English and second price auc t ion should y i e l d  
t h e  same revenue while the Dut c h ,  assuming some r i s k  ave r s ion , should y ie ld 
more than bot h .  The fact  is , however ,  that  the butch auc t ion yields amoun ts 
l ess than o r  equal to the other  two ( Coppinger, Smith and T i tus 1980) . The 
Dutch auct ion a lso yie lded less revenue than the f i r s t  p r i c e  auc t ion �1 ich 
is  theoret ica l ly s imila r .  
The most d rama t i c  d i f f e rence within the class o f  oral  auct ion 
ins t i tut ions occurs with the one s ided auc t i ons . The approach to  
equil ib rium is  f rom a bove ( be l ow) i f  the auc t ion is  a one-sided bi d ( o f f e r )  
auc t ion . That is,  i f  buyers ( s e l lers)  c a n  hid  ( o f fe r )  wh i l e sellers 
( buy ers ) must a c c ept or  rej ect wi thout making counLer off e t·s ( b i ds),  
then the ap proach is  from a bove ( b e l nw) , The d i s tt· ibution of  i ncome
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is  aga inst the s id e  which articulates the terms ( Sm ith 1964; Pl ott, 
Sm ith 1978) . Exactly why this occurs is not known but some sort o f  
"counterspeculation" seems to be occur r in g .  The "accepting" s i d e  o f  
the market seems to antici pate a s  a group the potential for inc r eased 
(decreased)  p r ices as buyers ( sellers)  b id ( o f f e r )  in  competition 
among themselves . Even tho ugh a prec ise theor etical model does not 
ex ist, notice the impl ication of the result. Sell ers who fac e a n  oral  
auction institution would  prefer that the buyers b id .  To  the  extent 
sellers c a n  orga n i z e  thems elves to compete by accepting favorabl e b id s  
and not making counter o f fers , the a pproach to equ i libr ium and thus 
pro f its will be i n f lu enced in  the i r  favo r .  S imilar l y ,  markets organi z ed 
as oral o f f e r  markets may h ave some use as too l s  to cou nteract " unj usti f ied 
market power" o f  s el l ers . It is important to note , however , that the 
nonmonopol ized one s ided oral  auctions examined to date have all been 
nea rly 100 perc ent e f f ic i ent. The institution a f f ects only the d istr i­
bution of i ncome . 
The importanc e o f  industrial structu r e  has not been systematical l y  
exp lored . For o ne r eason the results under the oral auction institutions 
a p p ea r  to be almost ind epend ent o f  industrial structu r e .  Exper iments 
w i t h  three and four sellers converge with regu larity to the competitive 
equ il ibrium. If infl u ences f rom industr ial structu re ex ist for 
nonmonopol ized ma r kets under the o ral double aucti o n ,  they a r e  
not so pronounced a s  to be cl early  detectable i n  a large a nd va 1-ied
d a ta SL't. 
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B.  Negotiated Pi- ices 
Negotiated p r ic e  ma r ket institutions a r e  tho se w ithin which 
the terms o f  trade are p r ivately negotiated with each tra nsactio n .  
Exp er imentally thes ,e cond itions have been implemented through a tel ephone
system where buyers and s e l l ers , eac h located in a pr ivate o f f  i c e ,  
negotiate p r ivately b y  telephone . Buyers can call  sellers and vice 
versa and d iscuss terms and /or  agree on a contract p r i c e .  Contact 
among buyers or among sell ers is usual l y  prevented . Consequently i n  these 
markets information a bout p r ices is not public . Buyers c a n  shop 
among sellers and shopp ing costs a r e  low ( in some experiments a dvertis i ng 
is permitte d )  but shopping and negotiating are the only sources o f  
informatio n .  
T h e  f irst experiments o f  th is kind w e r e  d o n e  b y  Hong and 
Plott (1977).  The d istr ibution of  p r ices f rom one such exper iment 
is shown in  Figu re 6 .  A s  c a n  b e  seen , t h e  system beg ins w ith a h igh 
var iance .  Evidently some buyers  a r e  j ust b etter negotiato r s  tha n others 
b ut the sou rce  of this ( d i s ) advantage , whether they shop mo r e  ( less ) , 
ma ke mo re ( l es s )  cr ed i b l e  p romises o r  th r eats , etc . , is u nknown. 
With time the va r iance  shr inks . The mean price a pproaches the 
competitive equ il i b r ium. When d emand shifts (per iods 5 and 9) the pric es 
a p p roach the new equ ilibr ium.  Ef f ic i ency in these markets is in the 80 
perc ent and 90 percent range as is shown on th e f igure . Vo lume in the 
Hong and P lott experiments rema ins above the competltive-equ il lb rlum vo lume . 
This resu l t  when combined with tho se o f  Chamber] i n  ( 1 948) suggests that 
poo r i n fo rmation may result in  above competitive-equ i l i b r ium vo lume . 
Only two d i f f erent industrial structures have been expl o red 
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within  this  market ins t i tu t io n .  The Hong a n d  Plo t t  s tudy had eleven 
buyers o f  a bo u t  equal s iz e .  T h e  twen ty-two s e l l ers , however , ranged 
f rom very large ( th e  f ive l a rgest  f i rms had 60 percent of the ma rke t )  
to  very small sellers , some o f  whom should no t exist  acco rd ing to 
t he compe t i t ive mod e l  because the i r  costs  were a bove the competi t ive 
equil i b r ium p r ic e .  As i s  impl i c i t  in  the price t ime series , the 
compe t i t ive mod el is reasonably accura t e .  The exc e p t ions were the 
marg inal sell ers who wer e able to exi s t  by s el l ing at pric es a bove 
the comp e t i t iv e  equil ibr ium p r i c es to ( evidently)  poo rly informed 
buyers o r  thos e  who d id no t care to sho p .  
The second s tudy  i s  b y  Gr ether and Plo t t  (1981) who s tud i ed 
telephone marke ts with  two la rge sellers (JS per c en t ea c h )  and two smal l
s e l l e r s  (15 perc en t each ) . Sellers  in the exper iment  even had accura t e  
knowl edg e  o f  t h e  ma rket d emand func t ions . The average p r ices a s  shown 
for a l l  periods  on Figure 7 a r e  typical o f  the general resul t s .  S imilar 
to the Hong and Plo t t  r esul t s ,  p r ices s ta r t  w i th a h igh va r iance .  W i th 
t ime,  var iance is r educed and the compet i t iv e  e q u il ibr ium is approached . 
C .  Po s t ed Pr i ces 
Po s ted price  ins t i tu t ions are  those  in which a ll pr ices 
are publ ic and no d iscou n ts are mad e from the pos t ed prices . Fu r t hermo r e ,  
po s ted p r ices a r e  c hanged onl y a f ter  some period o f  advanced regis t ra t io n .  
I n  exper imen tal marke ts t h e  ins t i t u t io n  i s  impl emen ted a s  fol lows . The 
po s t ing a gen ts dec ide between ma r ke t  p e r iods wha t the pdce is to po s t  nex t 
per iod ,  Each n gen t mnkes the pr ic ing d ec is io n  in p r i va t e  and submits  t h e  
pr ice to t h e  exper imen t e r .  A f t e r  co l l ec t ing the pr i c es the exper iment er 
announces all  p r ices and the market opens.  No price  c hanges from 
po s ted p r ices a r e  all owed d u r ing a p e r io d .  
The po s ted p r i c e  ins t it u t io n  h a s  rece ived more schola r l y 
a tt e n t io n  t han a ny o ther .  Frequen tly , howeve r ,  tho s e  cond u c ti ng 
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the research d i d  no t view t hemselves a s  engaged in a compa r a t ive 
i ns t i t u t ional a nalys i s .  The o r i g inal d uopoly exp e r iments o f  Hogga t t  
(1959)  and o f  Fou raker and S iegel (1963)  c a n  b e  interpreted as  having 
u t il i z ed the po s ted price ins t i tu t io n .  Almos t all "market  games" 
and " p r isoner ' s  d il emma" exp e r imen ts can b e  interpr e t ed a s  having 
po s t ed prices . Nevertheless , it wa s no t u n t il 1978 ( Pl o t t  and Smi th)  
tha t it  b ecame r ecognized that  the pos t ed price  i ns t i t u t io n  has  i t s  
own i nd epend ent  e f fec t s .  
Two general i z a t ions  seem poss ible a t  t h is t ime. The mos t 
signi f ica n t  general iza t ion i s  tha t po s t ed o f fer  ( b i d )  ma rkets t end 
to have higher ( lowe r )  p r ices than do oral  double au c t io n  markets . 
This i s  higher ( lower)  in tha t the ad j us tment  to equ i l i b r ium tend s  
t o  b e  f rom above ( below) and t h e  convergence i s  slower i f ,  ind e ed , the 
pos ted prices a r e  to converge a t  a l l .  S econd l y ,  e f f ic i ency tends 
to b e  lower under the pos t ed p r ice ins t i t u t ions than under  the o ral 
double auc t ions . 
These t end encies were f ir s t  observable in exper iment s  r u n  
b y  F .  Will i ams ( J 97 J )  who inco rrec t ly t hought they w e r e  d u e  to  the 
fac t that his t rad ers could buy or sell mor e  than one u n i t .  Previous 
exp e r  i men ts wen• oral auc t io ns in which each tt·ade had con t ro l  o f  
only one u n i t .  W i l liams was i nteres ted i n  t raders �m co n t ro l l ed 
mul t i p] e un i t s  bu t in mov i n g  f rom one type o f  inc en tive to the o ther 
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he a lso changed the institution. The results o f  two o f  h is exper iments 
are s hown in Figure 8 .  These  s how th e cumul ative vo l ume o f  trad es 
at each p r ice ( e . g. ,  the cu rve indicates the numb er of trades at p r ice P 
or abov e ) .  Pr ices a t  f irst a r e  r emoved f rom equil ibrium which is  $ ,  60 , 
but with time they converge clo s ely to it. Whether o r  not po s ted p r ice 
mar kets ever stabilize  at the competitive equil ibrium is  a n  open 
question, Certa inly this does not o ccur within the number of periods 
characteristica l ly necessary for oral auctions. 
The Williams resu l ts were repl icated by Plott and Smith 
( 19 7 8 )  who a l so d emonstrated that the market institution and not 
multiple  units is the cause. The pos s ib l e  importance o f  basic ma rket 
cond itions and industr ial structu re und e r  posted p rices is investigated 
in Ho f fman and Plott ( 1981)  and Hong and Plott ( l 9 7 7 ) .  I n  the former 
posted p r ices in markets with storage and speculation were stu d i ed. 
In the l atter study th irty-three  sellers  were  involved as o ppo s ed to 
the f o u r  in all  other exper iments .  The  two g eneralizations wer e  
observed to ho l d  i n  all  ca s es. 
The P lott and Smith experiments·and many subsequent exp eriments 
used people as buyers who cou l d  withhold purcha s es and p l ay favor ites 
to enco u rage low p r ices. The W i l liams experiment on the other hand 
util ized a computer in some s es s ions to s imulate d emand ers acco rd ing 
to the fol lowing strategy : f i rs t ,  purcha s e  f rom the l ow pr iced seller  
a l l  s(h e )  wished to  s e l l  and  then move to  th e next low p r iced s el l e r , 
continu ing until excess d emand does not exist. One o f  the p rincipal 
d iscover ies of Pl o tt and Smith was that their d emanders behaved pa s s i vely 
(or purely comp etitivel y) almost exactly l i ke the W i l l iams compute r .  
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Th is sugge s t s  that  one o f  the maj o r  features o f  the pos ted ins t i tu t ion 
is  tha t the " power" o f  the nonpos t ing side is somehow e l imina ted . F nJin 
an in t u i t ive point o f  view one can see  that when fac ing pos ted p r i c es , 
abs t inence f rom purchases ( s a l e s )  is less  l ikely to be met by mo re 
f avo rable terms because once the price  is  pos ted it canno t be changed 
until a f ter  the buy ing p e r i od is  ove r .  " Count erspecul a t io n" as pres e n t  
in one s i d ed o r a l  auc t ions i s  absen t under po s ted pr ices . 
I V .  MONOPOLY 
Two d i fferent types o f  monopoly expe r imen t s  have been cond u c t ed , 
The f ir s t  a nd po s s ibly  the mos t  releva n t  case f o r  ind u s t r ial o rganiza t io n  
theo r i s t s  is t h e  c a s e  o f  a s ingle seller  w i t h  a variable suppl y .  The 
second case is  one in whi c h  a f ixed supply is  to  b e  auc t io ned o r  o therwise 
comple tely  sold accord ing t o  some typ e  of comp e t i t ive b id d ing proces s ,  
A .  Variable Supply 
The d if f er ence in mar k e t  p e r fo rmance und e r  o ral auc t ions a s  
opposed to  pos ted p r ices when there a r e  s everal s e l l e r s  l eads na tura l ly 
to an inqu iry about the case o f  a s ingle  s el le r . Mono poly exper iment s  
und er bo t h  ins t itu t ions ( Sm i t h  1 98 1 )  provide a d r ama t ic d emons t ra t io n  
o f  t h e  impor tance o f  b o t h  ind u s t r inl s t ru c tu r e  a nd t h e  market ins t i t u t ional
environment  in d e t e rm i n i ng marke t perfo rmanc e ,  
Monopo l y  c:an d e f ini tely cause  pr ices t o  d :lve1-ge f rom the 
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comp e t i t ive equ i l i b r ium. Howev e r ,  when the market is  o rganized a s  an 
o ral double auc t io n ,  the monopoly mod el J t sel f does no t d o  so wel l .
There  i s  a s t rong t end ency for  p r ices t o  e rod e away from the monopoly 
equ i l ibr ium p r i c e .  On occasio n ,  in  Smi th ' s  expe r imen t s  the prices 
actua l l y  approached the compet i t ive equil i b r ium. The d a t a a re 
s u f f i c iently m ixed and the numbe r  o f  obs erva tions a r e  so smal l tha t 
we canno t d e termine which model , the monopoly model  o r  t h e  pure  
compet i t i ve mod e l , will  b e  the easies t to mod i f y  to cap t u 1·e  
the b ehavior for  monopo l i zed o r a l  double  auc t ions . F igu re 9 
reproduces the t im e  series f rom a par t i cularly  interes t ing expe r iment 
which d emons trates  the d i f f icu l t y  with making any general s ta t ement 
about the compara t ive accuracy o f  the mod e l s ,  P r ices s ta r t  high nea r  
t h e  monopoly p r ic e ,  erode  t o  t h e  comp e t i t iv e  equil ibrium,  r e turn  to 
the h igh l ev el s ,  and begin to erode aga in. This interes t ing behavior 
s eems to b e  a t t ributable to the buyers who have cons iderable power 
under this ins t itu tion,  Perhaps b y  " counterspeculat ion" 
t hey t end to wi thho l d  purchases a nd force prices down when fac ing a 
monopo l i s t  in this arena . Exac t l y  wha t coo rd ina t es t h i s  ac t io n  is  
unknown ( these buyers canno t communic a t e  except  through bids  a nd o f fers)  
but ,  a s  will be s hown below, cer tain ins t i t u t ions s eem to p revent I L  and
therefore help the mono pol is t ,  
In contra s t ,  when the mar ke t  ins t i tu t ions a r e  po s t ed pr ices , 
a d i f f erent  p ic ture emerges for  the case o f  monopo l y. W i t h po s ted p r i c es 
a mono pol is t behaves almo s t  exec t ly as the monopo ly theo t-y asser ts . The
resul ts  of one experiment a r e  i n  Figure 10 .  T h e  mono po l. i s t  adj u s t s p r i c es 
to measure d emand . The measurements are  accu ra te because und e r  the 
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posted p r ices the buyers d o  not "countersp ecul ate" and thu s  tend to 
reveal the accurate d emand at each p r ice. The monopo l ist ascerta ins 
the p ro f  it at eil " h  p r ice , s ets p r ice at that l evel and then l eaves it 
there ,  Compared to the  o ra l  auction the  posted of  fer ma rket is  
very mechanica l .  These data suggest that where monopo l ists have 
the power to d etermine the market institutions , a s e l f- interest 
cal culation would lead to some var iant of a posted structure. 
B .  F ixed Supply 
Industr ial  o r ganization theo ry has traditiona l l y  been focused 
o n  the case o f  var iable  supp l y .  Such focus i s  und erstandable  b ecause
i f  the  supply  is  f ix ed ,  the  e f f iciency issues d e r ived f rom the 
monopolist ' s b ehavior  are almost nonexista nt. Unl ess o f  course  the 
mo nopo l i s t  can p r ice d iscr iminate, the b ehavior o f  a monopol ized ma rket 
with a f ixed suppl� which must be sold d u r ing a g iven market perio d ,  
i s  exactly l ike that o f  a competitive mar ket. Nevertheless the f ix ed 
supply cas e  is o f  ind epend ent interest both a s  one critical step 
(ma r keti ng th e su pply)  in a two step (determin ing suppl y )  monopoly 
decisio n  process a nd because f ix ed suppl ies ( o r  resource d emands ) a nd 
the resul ting competitive b id d ing mar kets a r e  f requ ently involved i n  
gove r nmental d ecis ions in which s upply (or  d emand o r  p rocurement) quantity 
deci s ions  a r e  made by a po l itica l p roces s .  
T h e  f i rst s ea l ed-b id  exper iments with many bidders were 
conducted by Smith ( 1 9 7 6a ) .  1�ese exper iments were motivated by a 
co ntroversy about the U n i ted S t a te,, Treasury market bond s .  The
Treasury uses a sealed-bid  d iscr iminative auction and c r itics of the 
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Treasury bel iev erl Lhat a s ea l ed - b id one-pr ice auction  would genera te 
mor e  money . A more recent problem regarding method s  o f  a l locating 
the r ight to land at four o f  the natio n ' s  bus iest a i rports aga in focused 
research on the p roperties o f  these two d i f f erent types o f  a uctions 
( Grether , Isaac , a nd Plott 1981) . 
Smith used a methodo logy in wh ich lotteries were a ucti o ned . 
Belov icz ( 1 9 7 9 )  us ing th is same methodo logy expl o r ed extensively the 
pr incipal hypothesis which emerged f rom Smith that the r el ative 
r ev enu e-generating ca pabil ities of the two auction institutions dep end ed 
cr iticall y  u po n  the magnitu d e  o f  excess d emand . The results emerging 
from that study are  mixed. 
The methodo logy was changed i n  M i l l er and Plott ( forthcoming) and 
in Cox ,  Smith , and Wal ker (1981) to one in which the personal val ue 
o f  the obj ect was known w ith certainty but the value to other b idders
was u n known. I n  the former study b idders could  purchas e  mo r e  than 
one un it, a nd aggregate d emand was stationary for many p e r iods ( but 
subj ect to an o cca s iona l shi ft) , Individual d emands wer e rotated i n  
a manner which preserved aggregate d emand but changed each ind ividual 
d emand each per iod . In the l atter , bidders could  purcha s e  only one 
un it ,  each per iod values were generated randoml y ,  a nd o n l y  the 
d iscr iminative auction was stud ied . 
Both o f  these stud ies prov ide  support f o r  Nash equ i l ibr ium 
b id d i n g  mod e l s  when there  are severnl ( three o r  four)  b id d e r s . That 
is an equ i libr ium id entif ied as one i n  wh ich each ind iv id u a l  is 
o ptimiz ing g iven the actions o f  every other indlv l.d ual .  The Mill er­
Pl ott s tudy  suggests that the relative r evenue-generating capabil it ies 
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o f  the two ty pes o f  a uctions d epend u pon d emand elastic ity with 
d is c r im inative auctions generating mo r e  r ev enue when d emand is  
r el atively inelastic and one-pr ice auctions generating mo r e  revenue 
when d emand is r e latively elastic . I n  part thi s  i s  due to the 
weight o f  " d isequ il i b r ium" auctions . After convergence takes place , 
they generate about the s ame r evenu e .  Thes e  r esults a r e  r ep l icated 
in the stu d y  by Grether , Isaac , a nd Plott (1981 ) . 
F igure 11 taken f rom Mil l er and Plott ( fo rthcoming) illustrates
the po i nt.  Th e l imit p r ice function i s  the curve LOL. The Nash 
equil i b r ium bidd ing curve is  the l in e  POL for  the d is c r iminative 
auction and i t  i s  LOL for the one price  auction when ther e  is  some 
uncerta inty . The actual b id s  for the f irst p e r iod under a d is c riminative 
auction a r e  as shown b y  dd , Unde r  one price  a uctions the d istr ibution 
of bids is  about the same for the f ir s t  p e r iod . Und er the one price  
auction the d i str ibution o f  bids approaches the  l imit p r i c e  function 
LOL a fter s everal p e r iods so the p r i c e  i s  P. The d i stribution of a ctual 
bids under the d iscr iminative auction in the tenth p e r iod is shown. 
S ince the a r ea A is  greater than the area B ,  the r ev enue u nd e r  the 
d is c r iminative auction i s  greater th i s  perio d .  
V .  OL IGOPOLY 
A po l a r  case of ca rtel theo ry is monopoly so in  a s ense 
the r esults of a p er f ectly functioning cartel were r ev i ewed i n  the 
prev ious s ection . A p r incipal conc l u s ion was that the per formance 
of  a monopo l y  ( pe r f ect ca rtel ) ma rket is  substantially a f fected by
the marketing institutions . Beca u s e  this  result  carr ies over so 
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s t rongly to t h e  cas e  o f  " imperfec t "  car t el s ,  t h e  r eview is o rganized 
accord ing to the market  ins t i tu t ions a s  o ppo sed to o ther ind u s t r ial 
s t ructural va r iables such as  numb er of  a g ents  in t he marke t ,  the  size  
of  agen t s , o r  d emand el a s t ic i ty . 
A. Oral Auct ion Markets  
Wi thin oral  auc t ion markets  two types  o f  s i tu a t ions have 
b een s tud ied : an "obvious"  ha rmony o f  interes t and expl ici t conspiracy . 
Mar ke t  par t icipan ts almo s t  always r ecogni ze a harmony o f  interes t 
and t h is r ecogni tion can be ident i f ied in the market  s igna l s  which 
occur almo s t  cons tantly in o ral double auctions . A f t e r  a contrac t ,  
when t h e  market is  o pen f o r  b i d s  o r  o f f er s ,  t h e  b id d ing will  
some times s ta r t  w i t h  a clea rl y  unacceptable  bid o r  o f f e r  ( e . g . , a one 
cen t b id or som e thing f a r  below any previously accepted price o r  
a n  o f f er f rom two t o  t en t imes h igher than any previously accepted 
price) . Such b id s  ( o f f e r s )  are  o f t en followed by s i m ilar bids 
( o f f er s )  f rom o ther buyers ( sell e r s )  who are  indica t ing a will ingness 
to keep o f f ers low ( h igh) . When this  happel)S the o ther s id e  o f  
the ma r ke t  t end s no t t o  b e  pass ive , Such "ou t rageous" t erms a r e  
f requ en tly answered b y  equally  rid icu lous terms from the o t her s id e  
wh i c h  i s  ind ica t ing tha t i t  t o o  h a s  available t ha t s tra tegy.  Even 
when there is no answe r ,  the  terms o f  such high bids  or o f fers a r e  
no t at'.t'. e p t ed as t h e  o ther s id e  simply wa l ts (counterspecul.a tes) . 
Comp e t i t ion  s l owly wo r ks the terms into the prev i ou s l y  accep ted 
rang e ,  S igna l s  such as  these never s eem t o  wor k  J n  the  double a uction 
ins t i tu t io n  o r  i f  they  do the e f f ect iveness is  no t immed iat ely obvio u s .  
ln some expe riments  a ha rmony o f  i n teres t is easily 
r ecognizable .  Jn  stud ies  by Mil l e r ,  P l o t t , and Sm i th ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 
Will iams ( 1 9 7 3 )  nnd Ho f fman and Plo t t  ( 1 98 1 ) ,  the  mar k e t s  hn<l two 
specula tors who cou l d  purcha s e  u n i t s  o f  en asset  in one p e r i o d  
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( p e r iod A)  and sell these i n  the nex t perio d  (pe1· iod B ) . These two 
ind ividual s were the only agents  who had t h e  a b il i ty to buy units 
and ca rry them forward . They had a cl ear in t er e s t  in ma inta ining 
a low pr ice in period A and a h ig h  p r ice in period B .  I n  s p i t e  o f  
t h i s  recogniza b l e in teres t and t h e  f a c t  tha t onl y  two agents had 
such powe r s ,  the mar ke t  behavio r is mod el ed wel l by an f n t e r t emporal 
comp e t i t ive equilibrium. 
The po int is mad e  somewha t  mo r e  fo rce fu U y  in Plo t t  and 
Uhl (1981 ) .  In these markets  four  middl emen had the ca pacit y to 
buy in one market  in wh ich  they were the only buyers and sell in a 
phys ica l l y  s epara t ed mar ke t  in wh ich they were the  only s el l ers . 
Unl ike the s pecu la t ion experiment s  referenced above in wh ich a l l  
par t icipan ts heard a l l  b id s ,  o f f e r s , and cont rac·ts i n  a l l  ma rkets , 
in t h e  P lo t t  and Uhl marke t s  the ini t ial sellers were one group o f  
peop l e  who saw t h e  action in the p r imary ma rket and the f inal pu rchases 
were a d if f erent  group of peopl e who saw only the a c t ion in the 
set'.ondary  ma rke t .  Bo t h  t h e  ha rmony o f  i n t erest and the col ] e t'. t iv e
power o f  the midd l emen was obvious (bu t expl ici t  conspiracy wa s no t 
po ss ible since th ey were never allowed to speak d J re� t l y  tn en c h  o th er ) . 
Neve r t he l ess, the comp e t i t ive nmd e l  f i t s the  da ta closel y . 5 
Jn two s tud i e s  foc a l  po ints  were g iven the oppo r t uni ty to 
op era te as  col lusive d evices . In Isaac and Plo t t  ( 198lb)  and in
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Smi t h  and Will iams (1981)  p rice ceilings ( fl oo r s )  were imposed 
sl igh t l y  above ( b elow) the e q u i l i b r ium.  A theory i s  some t imes advanced 
(Scherer 19 7 0 ,  pp. 51- 5 4 )  tha t such cont rols a c t  as a focal po int  and 
t hereby coon! ina t e  a t a c i t  co l lu s ion. In the  o ral double auct ion 
markets  r epo r t ed in these  s tudies there  i s  absolu tely no suppo r t  a t  
all  that  nonbind ing con t ro l s  opera t e  t ha t way. I f  any t h ing the �s i t e  
i s  true  w i t h  nonb inding c e i l ing ( floor)  opera t ing t o  l ower ( inc rease)  
pr:l eP.s. 
P r iva t e ,  preperio d  meet ings by one s i d e  o f  the mar k e t  were 
stud ied a s  a facil i ta t ing practice unde r  the doubl e  o ral auct io n  
ins t it u t ion b y  I s a a c  and Plo t t  ( 1 98 1a ) .  Four s e l lers ( buyers )  
were allowed t o  t a l k  f reely b e tween p e r iods  wh i l e  t h e  buyers ( sellers ) 
lef t the room to g e t  the  nex t per iod ' s  d emand (cos t )  func t ions . No 
side payment s  o r  p ro f i t  shar ing was allowed and d iscuss ions o f  s uch 
sch emes were p ro h i b i t ed. 
The s tudy  a s ked the following q u es t ions . Do traders d iscuss 
co llusion when g iven the  oppo r tu n ity? Can the  t rad ers formula t e  some 
so r t  of agreement ?  Once formula t ed , do they s t ick to i t ?  Can the 
consequences of t h e  cons p i racy be d e t ected in the indus t r ial conduct?  
The  answer to the f ir s t  two q u es t ions i s  y es. These  traders  
d is cussed conspira cy a lmo s t  immed i a tely and they had no  d i f f ic u l ty in 
a r t iculat ing an agreement. The answers t o  t h e  s econd two are no t 
w i t hou t q ua l i f ic a t ion. Da ta in F igure 1 2  prov i d e  a compar ison w i t h  the  
oral double  auc t i o n  when no  col l u s ion is present  ( th e  f irs t three
exp e r imen t s ) , with  t ho s e  in whi c h  there  is  a s el l er ' s  cons p i ra c y  
( th e  four t h  and f i f th )  and a b uyer ' s  cons p iracy ( th e  s ixth  and s even t h ) .  
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The t o p  cha r t s  a r e  t h e  average p r ices eac h  period. The m iddle cha r ts 
are  the per per iod vol umes , and t h e  bo t tom char t s  are  the  e f f i c i enc ies . 
I n  order  to see t t 1e e t  t ec t s ,  i t  is impo r tan t to no t i c e  t h e· 
nea r mono tone convergence o f  � three measures i n  the f ir s t  three
noncons p i r a torial  ma rkets. P r ices , volum e ,  and e f f i ciency . all  three 
mov e  mono t onically to the  compe t i t ive equilibri um l evels . Th i s  does 
no t happen i n  the consp i racy marke t s .  In  each of the fou r  exper iments  
with  conspiracy,  with  the  po s s ib l e  exc ep t ion o f  experiment III , at  l eas t 
one o f  these measures exh i b i t s  some erra tic  b ehav io r in t he s ense o f  
a " p ronounced" movemen t away f rom equilibr ium. In t h i s  s ense the conspiracy
might  b e  d e tectable f rom market  d a ta , b u t  experiment I I I  ind ica t es the  
d i f f icu l ty. No t ice in exper iment I I I  t here  is a s t rong t e ndency towa rd 
t h e  compe t i t ive l evels even t hough there is an a c tive conspiracy. 
Figure 1 3  will help expla in wha t i s  happening. Shown there 
is the sequence of b i d s , o f f e r s , and contracts  f rom exper iment I I I .  
This experiment involved the d rama t ic r ed uct ion in prices  i n  p e r iod 4 
as a resul t o f  a successful  buye r ' s  consp iracy. 
Some g eneral d i scu s s ion began a f t er p e r io d  3. No t e  tha t , unl i ke 
period 3 ,  the buyers i n  period 4 d id no t rush to accept h i gh seller  
o f fers. In per io d  3 ,  f ive of  the  f ir s t  s ix trades were o f fers
b e tween 83  cents and 88 cents. In p er io d  4 ,  no o f f er s  were acce p t ed 
until  they r eached 7 3  cen t s .  In per iod 5 ,  the t enth  b i d  w a s  a t  
7 2  cents. Be tween periods 5 and 6 t h e  sellers agreed to try  t o  
hold the  p r i c e  a t  7 1  cents. In period  6 ,  the  f ir s t  twenty-seven 
b ids  were all ei ther  a t  70 cents or 71  cent s , wi t h  s everal inter­
vening o f fers a t  7 2  cents igno red . The twenty-eighth  b i d  broke the  
agreement , and there  were  t en immed i a t e  trades a t  72  c ents. [ Ioaac 
and Pl o t t ,  198la } 
Of pa r t i cu l a r  interes t in t h i s  con t ex t  are  the  h i gh o f fers  in per iod 5 .  
These are interpreted a s  s ignal s  b y  sellers  a s  an a t t empt  t o  get  o th e r  
s el l ers t o  hold ou t. Frequen t l y ,  however , they are made by s el l ers 
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who have al ready so ld and now have on l y  high cost  units  wh ich t hey do 
no t expec t to s el l .  The cos t o f  s ignal ing t o  them i s  low. Never thel ess , 
the fact  t ha t  the  noncons pira tors a r e  no t s imply pas s ive ls o bv ious. 
The d i f f icul ty these cons p i rators  have in subs tant ially 
a f f ec t ing ma rket  cond u c t  seems to b e  r el a t ed to the market  i ns t i tu t ional 
env i ronmen t .  As the  Smith resul ts r ev iewed a bove d emons tra t e ,  even a 
per f e c t  consp iracy (monopoly)  has d i f f ic u l t y  in the double auc t ion 
when one adds t his  property of auct ion markets to the  fac t t h a t  o l igopo l is ts 
can have d i f f icul ty in achiev ing coo rd ina t ion even und e r  the  mos t  favorable 
cond i t ions . Perhaps i t  is no t surpris ing tha t the  ind u s t r ial  s t ruc ture  
used in t h e  Isaac  and  Pl o t t  exper iment s  ( fo u r  buyers a nd four s e l l er s )  
would  ma ke succes s f u l  conspiracy d i f f icul t .  
B .  P r iva t ely Nego t i a t ed P r ic es 
The only o l i gopoly markets s tud i ed w i t h i n  a market i ns t i t u t i onal 
environment i n  which all prices are p r ivat ely nego t ia t ed are those in the  
Gre ther a nd Plo t t  ( 1 98 1 )  s tudy r e f er enced a bove. I n  these marke t s  d emand wa s 
rel a t ively ine l as t ic. The supply cond i t io n  was one of excess capa c i ty a t  
a cons tant cos t over the relevant ranges . The ma rket  con t a i ned s everal 
s i m i la r ly s i z ed buyers , two l a rge sellers  and two v ery smal l sellers .  
No  ent ry was  po ssible. AJ l contrac t s  were nego t i a t ed and execu ted 
pr i va t e l y  by tel ephone. 
In these marke t s  each buyer and s e l l e r  was loca t ed in a 
p r i va t e  o f f  i c e .  Buyers had t h e  pho ne numbers o f  se l l e rs b u t  no t o t her 
buyer s ,  <1nd se l l e rs lrnrl  the phone numbers o f  buyers and no t o ther sellers . 
Thu s there was no poss l b i l  l ty o f  cons p i racy . I n  add i t i o n ,  phone calls  
were p r i va t e l y  mo n i t o r ed t h rough a ma s t e r  sw i t c hboard i n  a secretn r i a l
pool a s  a f u r t her contro l .  Subj ec t s  were to l d  t ha t  side  payments 
o r  d i scuss ions of  s id e  paymen ts  in any form ( e.g. phys ical threa t s )
were p roh i b i ted and tha t i f  a ny were de t ec ted t h e  experiment  would 
b e  t e rmina t ed immed i a t ely. 
In all o t her respec t s  these ma rkets were s i m i l a r  to those 
conduc t ed unde r  oral auction ins t i tu t ions . The t i me periods were 
longer ( t en to f i f teen minu t e s ) .  As might b e  expec t ed the vo l ume 
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i n  a t el ephone market moves slower because o f  the  t ime involved wi t h  
d ia l ing,  nego t ia t ing , e t c .  
Resu l t s  typ ical o f  these experimen t s  are  shown in F igure 7 
above. Var i anc e in p r ice is high a t  f irs t b u t  begins to shr ink over 
t ime.  Pr ices , as can be seen, hang sl igh tly a bove the compe t i t ive 
equil ibr ium. Nevertheless , the  ma rket behavior is s t il l  more closely 
approxima t ed by the comp e t i t ive equil ibr ium mod e l  t han any o t her 
" s tandard"  t heo ry. 
C ,  Po s ted P r ices 
The pos t ed p r ice ins t i t u t ion has been used i n  almo s t  all 
o l igopoly expe r iments. The p rac t ice was (perhaps i nadver tantly)
int roduced b y  l�gga t t  ( 1 9 5 9 )  and by Fouraker and  S iegel ( 1 9 63 ) . 
In the  Fouraker and S iegel  experimen ts each subj ec t seller wa s g i ven 
a p ro f i t  t a b l e  ind i ca t ing pro f i t s  ns a func t io n  of own p t· i c e  and the 
comp e t i t o r ' s  p r f r e. Hogga t t  used a ma t hema t ical d emand func t ion to 
d e t e rm ine revenues. I n  bo th cases the se l l ers , d u r ing a p e r io d ,  chose  
only a s ing l e  p r i ce and  the dec ision wa s i r revoca b l e .  Since  a f ixed
r evenue f unc l ion or p ro f i t  f u n c t i o n  wns p n > v id cd , t ill' p ro c ed u res
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imp l icitly  a ssume tha t buyers  d o  no t counte rspecu l a t e  and therefore  
behave "pass ively" as und e r  the  po s t ed p r ice ins t i t u t ion. Thu s ,  the  
resul t s  seem to mo s t  approp r ia tely b e  interpre t ed w i thin that  
cla s s  i f  ica t ion. 
Two d i f ferent d emand s tructures  were u s ed in these early 
exper imen t s . I n  one series o f  expe r im en t s  Fouraker and S i egel u s ed 
a homo geneou s  product in t h e  s ens e t h a t  a p r ice above a comp e t i to r s  
resul t ed i n  a sma l l  loss . This r e f l ec t s  a p r imary interest  o f  the  
exp e r imenters  in the Bertrand mod el of  price d e t erm ina t ion On the  
o ther hand , Hogga t t  used individual d emand f unct ions wh ich respond ed
nega t ively to lowered comp e t i t ive pr ices b u t  volume for the high 
p r ice comp et i to r  d id no t adj u s t  d iscont inuously to zero . This r e f l ects  
an interes t in Courno t behavio r .  Fouraker and S i egel also condu c t ed 
a series  o f  experimen t s  in wh ich subj ects each cho s e  a quanti ty. W i t h  
t h e  to tal  quan t i ty known t h e  expe r imen t er would choo s e  a p r ice accord ing 
to a p red e t e rmined d emand sched u l e .  All  subj ec t s  then so l d  their 
cho s en quant i ty a t  t h i s  p r ic e .  The d iscu s s ion b elow rev i ews the  
homogeneous case  f irst. 
I n  the Fouraker a nd S iegel d e s ign each comp e t i to r  i s  g iv en 
the prof i t  table s hown as F i gure  14 which is held cons tant for  the
dura t ion o f  s everal periods . Use o f  a pro f i t  table  impl ies that  the  
ma r ke t  d emand funct ion is known w i t h  cer t a inty ( unl ike experiment s  
d iscu s s ed above) . Pr ices above a compe t i to r ' s  p r ice resu l t  in no 
sales and a small loss . Co s t  cond i t ions are such t ha t  z ero pro f i ts 
were earned a t  the  compet i t ive e q u il ibr ium as shown . ( In a feature  
add ed by G .  L .  Murphy , referenced below, pr ice l eve l s  below this  
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Los s es on Duopoly Barga ining , "  Qua r t erly Journal o f  
Eco nom ics 80 (May 1966) : 308 . 
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involved a loss for a l l  agents . )  The economic interpr etation wou l d  be 
one o f  no r ents , and one cons equence of this lack o f  " p roducer surpl us" 
i s  that p r ices must necess a r i l y  approach the compet i t ive equ i l ibr i um 
f rom above. The major treatment var iabl e  i n  the bas i c  economic 
cond itions category was the symmetry o f  the  payo f f  f unc t ions , thu s  
i mply ing someth ing about  s im il a r ity o f  costs ( fo r  th e homogenous 
p roduct case the interpretation wou ld be that a l l  cos t s  are constant 
at z ero ) .  Market structures  were p r ima r i l y  duopo l ies but triopo l i e s  were 
a l so studied . 
The p r ima r i ly insti t ut iona l va r ia b l e  a s i d e  from the posted 
p r ic e ,  invol ved the amount of  knowl edge a va i lable  to agents. Und er 
the Fouraker and S iege l comp l ete info rmation cond ition , th e publ ic 
information was that a l l  agents knew a l l  pas t  cho i c es and prof its of a ll 
o t her agents. In the incompl ete info rmation cond ition , the p ub l ic 
info rmation was tha t  p ro f i t s  were unknown and an a gent only knew 
whether h is price was h igher or lower than the  competito r ' s .  
I f  one uses  a s  the market p r ice the l owest price  in the 
market (the p r ice at wh ich a l l  trad es take p l ace)  then Fouraker a nd 
S iegel d iscovered a s t rong tendency for  prices  to converge towa rd 
the compet itive equ i l i b r ium. By  the fourteenth per iod the competitive 
equi l ib r i um price p r eva i l ed in e l even of s eventeen ma rkets and wa s at 
the neighbo r i ng price  (the price nearest the compet i t i ve equ i l ib r i um) 
in the case o f  incompl ete information and even the r ema i n ing p r ice 
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was c loser to t he compe t i tive e q u i l i b r iwn than to the j n i n t  max imum. 
The comp l ete i n formation mar ke t s  were cha r'1 c t er i z ed by a 
highPr va1· ia nc P  i n  behavior. Six o f  these ma rke t s  were a t  the 
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compe t itive equ i l i b r ium by the  fou rteenth period . Three mo r e  were at 
the ne ighbo r ing pr i c e .  Fou r  were exactly midway b etween th e comp e t i tive 
price and the j o int max imum and the other fou r were e i ther at the 
j o int maximum ( two ) or at the neighbor ing price  ( two) . The add itional 
in fo rmation p rovided in th i s  mar ket s etti ng tend ed to fa c i l itate 
col l u s ive behav i o r .  
Fouraker and S iege l a l so examined t r iopol y. Al l o f  the 
eleven  markets operating under incompl ete informa t ion conver ged by 
the fourteenth per iod to the competit ive equ i l ibrium . All but one 
of the ten marke t s  operating under comp l ete information converged 
to the competitive equ i l ibrium a lso. Thu s ,  in these experiments 
the number of s e l l e rs was an impo rta n t  var ia b l e  g iv en compl ete 
information .  
J n  a s t udy b y  Murphy ( 19 6 6 )  a s imi l a r  decay p ro c es s  was 
observed in duopo l ies operating und er the incomp l ete info r mation
cond ition. I n  genera l ,  howev e r ,  h e  found the decay p rocess  to be 
slower with pr ices tend ing to hang somewhat h igher above the compet i t ive 
equ i l ib r ium than d id Fou ra ke r  a nd S iegel . By the four teen t h  period 
thi r t een of  s event een duopo l ies were c l o ser to the compet itive 
equ i l ibr ium than the j o int max imum. The Mu rphy expet· iments cont inued 
ten periods beyond the fou r teen t h  period wher e  the Fourake r/ S i egel 
exper imen t s  s topped . At the  end of the  twenty - fou r t h  p e r iod , el even 
of the sevent een were closer  to the comp e t i t i ve equ i l ib r i u m t han the  
j o int  max imum and f i ve were exac t l y  a t  the _j o i n t  maximum. The 
variance across p e r iods w i t h in exp er i men ts  d e c reased . Thu s mar kP t s  
e i ther cnnvet·geu t o  t h e  j o int maxi mum o r  t he c o mpet i t i ve P< j l i i l ih r i um 
5 3  
g iven mor e  t ime w i t h  the add i t ional t ime also  add ing to the  tend ency 
o f  the  fo rmer.
The Murphy experiments invol ved three changes f rom the 
Fouraker and S iegel exper imen t s .  Mor e  p r i c e  e ho ices wer e  ava i l a b l e .  
Priees b elow t h e  comp e t i t ive equil ibr ium were poss ible wi t h  loses 
resul t ing in p r ices in that range and , of course t he exp e r imen te r  
and subj e c t  poo l s  d i f f er ed. Murphy conduc ted  only incomp l e t e  
informa t ion markets  w i th his  own p ayo f f  cha r ts . He conc luded , by 
compa r ing the ra t e  of coopera t ion w i t h  Fo uraker and S i egel , Lhu t 
t he t hrea t o f  losses  accounts for the  h i gher r a t e. This conclus ion 
is somewh a t  prema ture  witho u t  a control l ed expe r iment us ing the 
Fouraker and S iegel payo f fs a long w i t h  the  Murphy payo f f  in the 
same subj e c t  pool and des ign. Ra tes  of coopera t ion may wel l  d i f f e r  
s l ig h t l y  f rom subj ec t poo l t o  subj ec t pool and t ha t  might account 
for t he d i f fer ences with Fouraker and S iege l . Conv ergence to the  
j o int  maximum wa s no t mono tone. Ins t ead , almo s t  a l l  of the d uo po l ies 
exper ienced the comp e t i t ive d ecay at f irs t and then a f t er s everal 
period s ,  p r ices b egan to d r i f t  upwards for those t ha t  u l t ima t el y  
converged t o  the  j o in t  max imum. 
Presuma b l y  t his " coopera t ive" phenomenon in duopo l is ts 
opera t ing und er these cond i t ions is f a c il i t a ted by many t r ia l s  and 
exper ienc e. The l a t t e r  was explor ed extensively by S toecker (1980) 
within the  same pa ramet r i c  environment as Murphy b u t with comp l e t e  
info rma tion.  Ra t he r  than many p e r iods of  a s ingl e  market, S toecke r  
al lowed ind ividuals  to o b t a in exper ience f rom many ma rke t s  o f  t e n  periods 
each . Th i r ty-seven ou t o f  f i f ty duopoly ma r ke t s  managed subs tant ial  
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coopera t ion (at ur neilr t he j o int maximum) . Nune of t h e  rema in<l er
exh ib i t ed t he prop e r t y  of the o ra l  doub l e  auc t ion of mono tone conve rgenc e 
to the comp e t i t i ve equ i l i b r ium . Jumps o f  p r ice were common.  
The S toecke r  exper imen t s  provide new ins igh ts into the 
nature and possi b i l i ty of t a c i t  collus i on. Nine teen o f  t he t h ir ty-s even 
mar ke t s  which a t t il ined the coo rd ina t ed equ i l ib r ium near the j o int  
maximum d i d  so  w i t h  no  s i gnals  or  " l ea rning . "  l t  occur red w i th the  
f i r s t  p r i c e  cho ice wi t h  bo t h  comp e t itors choos ing the max imum and f o r  
t h e  mo s t  p a r t  the sy s t ems s tayed ther e .  The behavior  wa s preva l en t  
among duopo l is ts w i t h  p rev ious exp e r i ence. Thus , in t h is contex t ,  
in which the ha rmony o f  in terest  cou ld be c l ea r l y  ascerta ined with  
no  room for  ambigu i ty o r  confusion , some duopol ies needed no  means 
of commun ica t ing i n t ent ions a t  a l l .  Ta c i t  co l lu s ion occur red 
inuned ia t e l y .  For a subse t ( eigh t een) of these f i f t y  duopo l i e s  t he 
j o in t  maximum was no t the ind iv idual maximum g iven equal p r ices . 
Of these , thir t een a c h i eved s table  equ il ibr ium near the j o int  maximum 
and o f  the thir teen there  were four which a t ta ined t h e  equ i l i h r ium 
with  the  f ir s t  move. S inc e these duopo l is t s  had twen t y  p r ices to 
choose f rom , i t  wou l d  b e  d i f f icul t to asc ribe  these coord ina t ed 
ac t ions to chance. 
In Fourake r  a nd S L egel and in S to ecker bo t h  of the basic 
economic cond i t io ns of  p ro f i t  f unc t ion symme t ry ( S to ec ker s tu d i ed two 
d i f f er ent  types o f  asymmetry)  and the market s tr uc t u r e  ( two , three ,  and 
f ive agent marke t s )  were examined . Symme try resul ts in high market  
p r ices . Presumably t h i s  is  because  coord ina t ion is eas ie r-- the ac t ions 
o f  the o ther a gent s  can be mor e  clea r l y  und ers tood and t here  can be no
d isagreement over the J o int s t ra t egies . I f  bo t h  are  to charge the 
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same price,  a unique Pareto o p t imum ex is ts. An inc rease in  t he number 
o f  f i rms almo s t  a lways resul t s  in a convergence o f  p r ice to l evels nea r 
the compe t i t ive equil ibrium . Howeve r ,  a sl i g h t  u pwa rd b i a s  r ela t ive to 
the comp e t i t ive equil ibriwn even when the number of f i rms ls " la r ge , "  
appears to b e  pa r t  o f  the general p roper t i e s  o f  the pos t ed p r ice 
ins t i tu t ion.  
Fou raker and S iegel conduc ted ano ther s er i es of  experiments  
which can b e  in terpreted a s  a ca s e  of  nonhomogeneous p ro d uc ts. In 
t hese marke t s ,  sellers each d e termined a quan t i t y  in terpr e t ed as the 
numbe r  of units to be o f f er ed for sal e .  A f t er all d ec is ions were 
c o l l ec t ed by the exper imen t er , ma rket  p rice was d e t e rmined by 
evalu a t ing a f ixed ma rket  d emand function at the to ta l  quant i ty 
o f fered. Pro f i t s  of each agen t were d e termined by mul t iplying p r ice
by the agen t ' s volume. 
The r esu l ts at the  four teenth perio d  are summa r i z ed in 
Figure 15 . Each market is c a t ego r i z ed accord ing to the mod e l  which
mo s t  accura tely  p r ed ic ts to t a l  mar k e t  volume. As can be s een , the 
accuracy of the j o in t  maximiza t ion o r  c a r tel mod el d e c reases with 
an inc r ease  in number of agents and a l so a reduct ion of informa t ion ahnut 
t h e  o ther agen t s '  a c t ions . Int eres t ingly ,  the  Courno t mod el as opposed 
to the comp e t i t iv e  model s eems to be mos t  accura t e  in t h is 
" no nhomogeneo u s  commod i t y" case. I n  the previous experiments the 
two mod els could  no t be g iv en independ e n t  interp r e t a t ions. Here they 
can and t he Cou rno t mod el picks up much o f  the d a ta. Whether t h is is 
the na t u ral " u pwa rd b ias" o f  the pos t ed prices or an a c t ua l  man i f es ta t ion 
o f  the Nash equ i l i b r ium pr inciple is s t i l l  an open ques t io n .
The wo rk o f  Friedman ( 1 9 63 , 1969 , 1 9 7 0 ) , Hogga t t  ( 1 9 5 9 ,  
1 9 6 7 )  and Do lhea r ,  e t  a l .  (1 968)  h a s  ext end ed the po s t ed pr ice  
resea rch in several d i r ec t ions . In these mar ke t s ,  p roducts  are  
in a formal sense  no longer homogeneous. Reca l l ,  in the Fouraker 
and S i egel s e t t i ng ,  p r ices h igher than a compe t i to r ' s  r es ul t i n  a 
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loss to the comp e t i to r  with the h igher p r ic e. Presuma b l y  t h i s  ref !  ec ts  
the id ea t ha t c ompe t i t ion with  the  h i ghes t p r i c e  ma kes no sales  and 
t o  the ex t e n t  t h a t  co s t s  were incur red , mus t  s u f f er a l o s s . I n  the 
exper iment s  to b e  d iscussed now the  compet i to r  with  the h ighes t pr ice 
can s t il l  make some p ro f i t  but no t a s  much as would be the ca s e  i f  the 
p r ice were equal t o  or b elow the o the r ( s ) . As a resul t o f  t h is 
d i f ference in nw rket  cond i t ions the  informa t ion cond i t ions can b e  
a l t ered. Per f ect  informa tion means that  a l l  pro f i t  func t ions and 
pas t p r i c e  c ho i c es are known. I ncompl e t e  info rma t ion means tha t a l l  
pas t pr ices (or  quan t i t ies , a s  a pp ro p r ia t e) a r e  known bu t only an 
agent ' s  own pro f i t  func t ions are known. 
The f ind ings a r e  best  represen ted in the r ecen t  boo k by 
F r i edman and Hogga t t  ( 1 980)  which d escr ibes the resu l t s  o f  several 
ol igopol i s t ic ma r ke t s  u nd er varying parame t r ic info rma t io n  cond i t ions 
and subj ec t experienc e .  Rela t ive to o ther experiments  t h ese a r e  
excep t ional l y  compl ica ted b ecause subj ec ts  mad e produc tion  d e c i s ions 
and inventory d ec i s ions a l ong with price d ee Ls ions. S11 bj ects ga ined 
experienc e a s  in S to ecker by par t icipa t ing in a ser ies o f  d i f f erent 
markets over a long period of t ime.  In add i t ion to mo r e  re f ined 
mod els o f  ind iv idual d ec is ions , two ba s i c ma rket mod els a r e  compa red : 
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the j o in t  max imum mod el and the Cou rno t equil ibr ium. 1�e comp e t i t ive 
equ i l ibr iums where price equals marginal co s t  a r e  no t examined. Of 
cou r s e ,  the Cou rno t equ i l ibrium pr ices are a bove these pr i c e s ,  
Hogga t t  and Fr iedman d evo t e  much e f f o r t  t o  develop ing a 
mod el o f  ind ividual b ehavior. The mod el d eveloped , which has 
considerable suppo r t , assumes the  individual d evelops es t imn t es 
o f  the  o ther agen t ' s  p r icing d ecis ions by an extrapo l a t ion o f
prev ious d ecis ions , The ind ivid u al then op t imizes aga ins t t ha t 
es t ima t e .  The r esul t ing mar ket equil ibriums a r e  r e inforcing in a 
s ta t is t ical s ens e .  Courno t b ehavio r in t h is s ense i s  a good f ir s t  
approxima t ion o f  ind ividual b ehav ior when tacit  co l l usion i s  absent. 
If the ma rkets are c ha rac t er ized by perfect  informa t ion and 
symmet r ic p ro f i t  funct ions , the j o int  maximum is a good p re d ictor f o r  
markets  w i t h  up to four sell ers. Fo r the ma rket  with  s lx sell e rs , pr ices 
d ro p ped subs tant iall y  to the Cou rno t equil ibrium or j us t  a bove i t ,  I f  
6 symme try is d ro p ped o r  i f  per fect info rma t ion is d ro pped , the number
of s e l l ers b ecomes a v ery impo r tant  t r ea tment var iable  in tha t an 
increase in the number d es troys the  accuracy of the  j o i nt maximum 
mod el . In the duopoly markets , s ignif icant  (bu t l ess than p er f ec t )  
coopera t io n  occurs b u t ,  w i t h  an incr ea se in  t he number o f  f irms , 
i t  vanishes almo s t  completely and t h e  Courno t mod el is very accu r a t e  
b y  compar ison. 
Friedman and Hogga t t  conj ecture wha t S to ecker convincingl y  
d emons trates  tha t experience ma kes a d if f er ence. " New and inexperienced 
faces" can cause marke t p r ices to d e t er io r a t e .  
l�gga t t , Friedman, and G i l l  ( 1 9 7 6 )  and Fr iedman and Hogga t t  
( 1 980)  provid e the onl y a t t empts  to mod el the  s ignal ing ph enomenon.  
In  pa r t ,  s igna l s  a t·e  viewed n s  n t t en t ion g e t t ing d ev ices. Mos t  o f  
the  work is an a t t emp t t o  iden t i f y  a s i gnal a s  someth i ng d is t inct 
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bur ied in t he masses o f  d a ta of the ord ina ry sea rch ing and comp e t ing 
pr ice d ecis ions. W i thin the  pos t ed price ins t i tu t i on high or l ow 
p r ices have an immed ia t e  e f fect on p ro f i t s  so , as one mi gh t expec t , 
s ignals  occur rarely ,  r e l a t ive to o ther d ecis ions . S igna l s  are  id en t i f i ed 
as a type o f  "pul se" in wh ich an abrup t change o f  behavio r occurs for  a 
b r i e f  period (a sudden l a rge p r ice increase o r  d ecrea se)  f o l lowed by a 
re turn to t he original l evels . Friedman and Hogga t t  have a t t emp t ed to 
d evelop models wh i c h  will r ela te t h is a c t iv i t y  to overall p r ice changes 
and /o r  p r ice level s .  As o f  this  wr i t i ng t h ey have a reasona b l e  cha rac-
t er iza t ion of the phenomenon but f ee l  it happens so in frequently  in 
t he i r  data t ha t  the i mpl ica t ions canno t be asce r t a ined. 
Thus , fo r t he po s ted pr ice i ns t i t u t ion a p a t t ern is emerg ing . 
The ins t i tu t ion seems to fos ter h igher p r ices in general .  Fur t hermo r e ,  
und er a ppropr i a t e  basic economic cond i t ions and market s tr uctures , i t  
can f o s t e r  t a c i t  collus ion i n  t h e  s ense tha t t h e  j o in t  maximiz ing mod el 
is an accur a t e  pred ictor o f  p r icing pa t t erns. 
If the mar k e t  ins t i t u t ions a re the pos t ed p r i c e  a s  oppo sed 
to the o ra l  double auct ion and t he indus t r ia l  s t ructure is duopo l y ,  
a compl e tely d i f f er e n t  picture o f  cons p iracy emerges . F r i edman ( 19 6 7 , 
1 9 7 0 )  s tud i ed po s t ed p r ic es o f  d uopo l ies w i t h  asymme t r i c  payo f f  f unct ions. 
P e r f ect  info rma t ion exis ted in the sense t ha t  each comp e ti to r  knew a l l  
p r ev ious price cho ices and payo f f s  (up  t o  a scalar t rans fo rma t ion on  
occa s i o n ) . Comp e t i tors were  a l lowed to t ransm i t  two wr i t t en messages 
before p r iva tely ma king a p r ice d ec i s ion. Thes e  messnges were mad e 
in sequence w ith the same ind ividual initiating conta c t  for each o f  
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up to twent y- f ive periods (although mos t  were from s ix to fou r t een) .  
I n  h i s  data collusive agreements  were a tta ined i n  over 7 5  perc ent o f  
a l l  decis ions mad e  and o f  t he collusive agreement s  7 5  p ercent were 
Pa r e to optimal rela t ive to t he pair (no s i d e  payments wer e  a l lowed ) .  
The a b i l i ty to make such agreements increases w ith experienc e. Once 
a col l u s iv e  agreement has b een a tta ined and succes s fu l l y  impl emented , 
the probab il ity o f  ano ther s ucces s ful  agreement is . 96 .  
Cons p iracy does have impl ica tions fo r marke t conduc t .  
Perhaps t h is is  no surprise f o r  tho s e  who have obs e rved indu stry for 
years  but these  stu d i es d emon s t ra t e  the tru th of the  proposi t ion for 
those who have not had the b ene f it of such obs ervation o r  b el ieve 
that the "competitive d r iv e  to d e f ect" is  so strong thnt co llus ion 
is impo s s i b l e .  Howeve r ,  the impl ica t ions in terms o f  cond u c t canno t 
be d ivorced f rom both ind ustr ial s t ructure and the ma rket ins t i tu tiona l 
env i ronmen t ,  
D .  Markets with Advance Noti f ication and Price P rotection 
The recent a c t ions taken by the Fed era l  Trade Comm i s s ion 7 
have d rawn attent ion to the ma rket i ns ti tu t ion in the  anti knock compound 
. d 8 1n us try . Industrial pra c t i ces assure  cus tomers o f  a th i r t y-day advanc e 
notice  o f  p r i ce changes (increases ) .  Pr ices are q uo ted Jn terms o f  
del i vered prices wi t h  the same p r i ce preva i l ing regard l es s  o f  transpo rta t ion 
ens ts . I n  a d d i tion , cont-ra cts t y pical l y  incl ude a " p r i c e  protect ion" 
clause  wh i c h  guar antees (J ) that the seller  will  s e l l  to no one a t  a pr ice 
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l es s  t han the p r ice quoted the buyer and (ii) the s e l l e r  wi l l  meet any 
lower pr ice in the market or releas e  the buy e r  from the contract. 
The ind u stry s tructure  is c haracteri zed by two l arge s e l lers 
of equal size (approxima t ely 35  perc ent of the market eac h )  and two sma l l
s e l l e r s  o f  about equa l s i z e .  A l ong- run d ec l ining d emand (clue t n  a 
reduc t ion in l ead use in gaso l ine) a nd existing excess capaci ty discou rages 
entry . Eight  l a rge buyers account f o r  a bout 60 p ercent o f  the sales  and 
many very smal l buyers account for  the r es t .  
Grether and Plott (1981)  have expl o red ma rkets  with these  
properties. Each agent  wa s ass igned an o f f ice. Sellers were ahle  to 
po s t  p rices by means of a d i g ital e l ec t ronic d isplay system such that 
p r ice announcements wer e mad e known· immed iately to all mar ke t  agen t s .  
Orders were placed through t h e  tel ephone s y s t em. Price increases requ ired 
advance notice and all  transactions were mad e at advertised p r ices (the 
buyer protec t ion clause which precludes d iscoun t s ) , The indus t r ial  
struc t ur e  wa s a s  d escr ibed above w i t h  the ma r ket d emand and supply 
functions a s  shown in F igure 16 .  
The maj o r  conc l u s ion of  thi s  s tudy is  tha t the s e  prac t i c e s  
when combined w l th t h e  incl u s  tr ial s true  t u  r e  cau s e  pr ices to be a bove 
tho s e  tha t  wou l u  o t herwi s e  exis t .  F igure 1 6  g ives averag e  pr ices d u r ing 
each o f  sevent een trad ing periods. Ma rket ins t i tutions were a s impl e 
tel ephone market dur ing the f ir s t  twel ve perio d s. As can be seen, the 
pr ices begin to d ecay  toward the comp e t i t ive equ il ibr i um. The prac t ic es 
were impo sed fo r periods  1 3  through 1 6 .  A s  can b e  s een , p r i c es j un� 
immed ia tely to near tho s e  which exis t at the Courno t equil ibr ium . �1en 
the practices were r emoved (per iods 16 and 1 7 )  pr ices immed iately f e l l. 
These da ta are  t·ep r esenta t ive o f  th e pa t tern o f  f i nd ings f rom ten 
exp e r i mental markets. 
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The theoret ical explana t ion of this  phenomenon has some suppor t .  
Advance no t ice g iven su f f iciently in advance o f  the d ead l ine for advance 
no t i f ica t ion provides a s i gnal to o ther sel l ers. If the no t ice involves 
a p r ice s u f f icien t l y  f a r  in t he f u t u r e ,  it  induces no cur rent bus iness 
J os s .  Onl y a sing l e  p r i c e  i s  invo l v ed s o  the s igna l  i s  uncompl ica ted 
with  minimal d imens ions over which d isagreement can occur. Other s e ll ers 
know t ha t  if  they do no t increase p r ices before  the deadl ine , the  o r ig i na l  
f i rm w i l l  rescind t he p roposed p rice incr ea s e .  Thus o th e r  s e l l ers do no t 
have the o p t ion o f  " und e rsel l ing" and acq u i r ing a l a rger ma r ke t  s ha re. 
The Nash s tra t egy for such f i  · i ] rms .is s mp y to match the proposed p r ice 
if a uni fo rm indus try price a t  the h igher l ev e l  w i l l  increase the f i rm ' s  
pro f i ts and d o  no t h ing o therw ise . On the downs i d e ,  due t o  the homogenous 
na ture o f  the product , if no L the buy er ' s  i pro tect o n ,  p r f r e  cu ts  w i l l  
b e  matched , so the  incent ive t o  cu t pr ices d epends upon the  ant ici pa ted 
share of d emand increase due to lower p r ice l eve l s. Th is model  p red icts  
tha t pr ices will  ce r ta inl y be a t  Cou rno t l evel s  if  no t h igher . 
These ins t i tu t ions seem to have a n  e f f ect  on buyers s im i l a r 
to the pos t ed p r ice ins t i tu t ions . Buyers do no t ant i c i pa t e  d iscounts  
because the i ns t i tu t ions prevent t hem. Fur t hermo r e ,  s i nce any pr ice 
concess ions mus t be o f f ered to al l ,  buyers can see t ha t p r ice concessions 
can be cos t l y  to the sel l er and thus have l ess expec ta t ion o f  wi nning 
t hem . As a resu l t ,  the buyers seem to have l ess "counters pecu l a t ion"
t ha 1 1  i n ,  s a y ,  the t e l  epl10ne marke t s  alone.  Thus these l ns t l  t u t iuns 
appea r t" r em"ve "ne so u rce o f  buyer pressure fo r reduc ed pr ices wh i l e  
a t  the  same t i me eas ing t h e  p ro b l em o f  p r ice coo rd i na t ion fo r t h e  s e l l e r  
n 1 1d e l  imi 11a t i 11g t he advanL < 1g 1•s  n f  p r· fr e  c u t s .  
64 
V l .  DEFENSE OF l':Xl' EH I M ENTS
Many o f  the s t ud i e s  reviewed a bove wer e des igned and ex ecu ted 
to answer rea sona b l y speci f ic ques t ions rela ted p r ima r i l y  to ba s ic 
science .  Some t imes app] i ed scien t i s t s  d i sm iss the exper Lmental  resu l t s 
and m ethods as b e ing i rr el evant and inappl ica b l e. Need l ess to say ,  mo s t  
q u e s t ions canno t b e  answered b y  appl ying exp er imen t a l  method s .  The 
theme of this  sec t ion is on  the a r t  of pos ing ques t ions wh ich can .  
The r el evance o f  exper iment a l  methods res t s  o n  t h e  pro po s i t ion  
t ha t  labora tory ma rkets are  " r eal" market s  in the  s ense t ha t  p r inci pl es 
o f  economics a pp l y  there  as well  as elsewher e .  Rea l peo p l e  pursue
real  p ro f  i t s  w i th in the contex t  o f  r ea l  r u l e s .  The s impl ici ty o f  
l abora tory ma rke t s  in compar i son w i t h  na tural l y  occu r r ing mar ke t s  mus t  
9 no t be confused w i t h  q u es t ions abo u t the i r  r ea l i ty as mar ke ts. 
If  the r ea l i ty of  l a bora tory ma rkets  as  mar kets  i s  acce p t ed ,  
then the a r t  o f  po s ing q u es t ions res t s  o n  a n  a b i l i ty to make the s tudy 
o f  s im p l e  special  cases r e l evant to an unders tand ing of t h e  compl ex .
General theo r ies and mod e l s  b y  d e f in i t io n  apply t o  a l l  s p ecial  ca ses . 
Ther e f o r e ,  general  theo r ies and mod e l s  should be expected to wo r k  
i n  t h e  special cases o f  l a bo r a tory marke t s .  A s  mod els f a i l  t o  
ca p tu r e  wha t  i s  observed in t h e  specia l cas es , t hey can b e  mod i f ied o r
r ej ect ed i n  l ight  o f  exp e r ience. The rel evance o f  experimental  m e t hods 
i s  the r eby estab l i shed . 
Several  d i f f erent r esearch s t ra tegies are  apparent in the  
resea rch reviewed in this  paper  b u t  f i ve w i l l be iden t i f ied here . 
1 .  Theory Rej ect i on .  A model  may be so poor at c a p t u r ing observed
behavior tha t  i t  may be best to cons id er it no further o r  use i t  
even i f  no alte rnative model  is ava ilable ,  The  o r igina l experiments 
by Smith could be viewed as a potential basis f o r  rej ecting the 
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ideas o f  d emand and supply. I f  the model had not been at all accurate 
when appl i ed to a s imple ma rket d es igned exp l i c itly to give the mod el 
its " b est chance" then it could b e  rej ected. Howeve r ,  the model 
worked a nd as  a result the o r iginal experiments were ess ential l y  
ignored b y  t h e  economics p ro f es s io n ,  Those who had  a strong b e l i e f  
in p r inciples o f  d emand a n d  supply sa id t h e  results were "obvious." 
Critics o f  d emand and supply d ismissed the r esults saying that the 
mar kets were " r igged" so that d emand and supply would wo rk. When the 
approach is one o f  "mod el rej ection , "  negative r es ults , instead o f  
pos itive r esults , a r e  " interesting." 
2 .  Theory Competitio n ,  In  most cases competing models  exist and 
existing d ata are not an adequate basis for r ej ecting one in favo r  o f  
the other. The idea , the n ,  is to c r eate s impl e  laboratory markets 
which a r e  special cases o f  mar kets in wh ich the mod e l s  a r e  genera l ly 
appl ied. The experiments w i l l ,  hope fully ,  ind i cate which is mor e  
accurate in the s imple cases. Wh ile  r elative accuracy in a s imple 
_case does not p rove that the model will continue to be relatively 
accurate when appl ied to the comp l ex ca se , it does provide some 
experiences with the mod els. More importantly , i t  places the burden 
of p roo f squarely o n  thos e  who continue to advo cate the " lo s ing" 
mod el to establ ish why the mod el  they prefer would  do relatively 
poo rly  in s imple c a s es but r elatively accurately in the comp l ex .
Presumabl y b y  apply ing add i t ional theo ry and more compl icated 
expe r iments , the c r ed ibil ity of thei r  belief  could be examined. 
3 .  Model Ro bustness . We have seen that changes in  the  ma r ket 
institutional envi ronment can change market perfo rmance. These 
facts were d i scovered as  experimenters inqu ired about the accuracy 
66 
of the comp etit ive model  under alternative institutional regimes . 
These were checks on the robustness o f  the model  under institut ional 
perturbations. S imil a rl y ,  some stud ies have checked t he robustness 
of the mod e l  u nd e r  pa rametric pertu rbations such as numb e r  o f  
competitor s ,  d emand elastic ity , etc. Even though no fo rmal theory 
exists (or  a ny theory at all)  about the influence of  the s e  factors , 
it is only natu ra l to check.  The n ,  o nce an important va r la b l e  is 
found which wa s not anticipated by ex isting theo r y ,  the d ata f rom the 
exper iments s erve as  a motivation f o r  the d evelopment of exten s ions 
of the theo r y  to cover th e new facts. The infl u enc e of the posted 
price  is a good examp l e. No formal theory exists y et wh i c h  comp l e t ely 
expla ins the propC'rt ies  o f  this institution. 
4 .  Measurement. When most scholars  think o f  experiments , they have 
measu rement in mind ( e.g., what l s  the probabil ity o f  tac it col l u s ion? 
What is the speed of adjustment to equil ibri um? ) .  Laboratory exper imental
method s  can be appl ied to these ends but none of the exp e r iments above 
were pred icated on the hypothes is that they were measuring numer ical 
constants o f  natu r e ,  Questions o f  this natur e  would seem to r eq u i r e  
elaborate sampl ing p rocedures and expl ic it d e f initions o f  t h e  popul ations 
to wh ich the measurement i s  to be applied , The studies a bove all  
involved hypotheses about r elative behavior as opposed to  numer ical  
constants. 
5 .  S imul a t ion. Ano ther popular preconcep t ion about the func t ion o f  
expe r imen ts i s  s imul a t ion. In c i rcums tances in which a po l icy is 
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go ing t o  b e  impos ed on a soc ial system,  s imul a t io n  obj ec tives i nvo l ve 
a n  a t t emp t t o  r ecr ea t e  the s i tu a t io n  o n  a small er scale  i n  order  to 
p rovi d e  d ec i s ionmakecs w i t h  some exp e r i enc e w i th how the s i tua t ion 
might evo lve. 
I f  there i s  no theory  to indi c a t e  wh ich var iables a r e  
impo r t an t ,  the comp l ex i ty o f  t h e  sma l l  s i tua t io n  m u s t  m i r ro r  the  
comp l e x i t y  of  the  l a rge a s  closely a s  is poss i b l e. Fur thermo r e ,  w i t ho u t  
t heory to u n i f y  the  observa t ions , the  experiment mus t b e  conduc ted 
enough t imes to a s sure  the " s t a t is t ical va l id i ty" o f  a ny asser ted 
pa t t ern in the resul ts. Thus theory , even i n  the  case  o f  s imu la t io n ,  
s e rves impo r ta n t l y  t o  s impl i fy t h e  experimen tal  p rocess. The mor e  
t ha t  accepted t h e o r y  c a n  b e  i nvoked , the  less  the  exp e r iment a l  p ro cess  
need s to "mi r ro r" t he natural analog. The  t end ency of  scholars  to 
rej ec t  experimen t a l  methods  as i rrelevan t  may h e  b ecause  they a re 
fundamen t a l l y  in teres ted in s imula tion while  b ei n g  unawa r e  o f  the  
r o l e  o f  theory o n  t he o ne hand a nd being v ery awa r e  of  the comp l exi t i es 
o f  t he s i tua t ion (and the impossibil i t y  o f  r ecrea t ing i t )  on the  o ther
hand. 
The a rguments  above are s tr a ight forward , bu t i t  i s  easy to 
be  p u l l ed o f f  t rack. Somet imes scholars  use  the term "real  wo rld" to 
re fer to nnnlabora tory pro c esses and the term " a r t i f i c i a l  market"  o r  
" s imu l a t ed ma rke t" to r e f e r  to l aboratory  mar ke t s. Such l a nguage 
i nv i t e s  c r i t ic ism b y  fail ing to acknowl ed ge the a r gument above abou t 
labora t o ry marke t s  be ing rea l ma rke ts. In add i t io n ,  the language 
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s ugges t s  tha t t he prima ry t e s t  o f  rel evance fo r l abora tory marke t 
resul t s  i s  how c lo s el y  the  labora tory ma rket a p p rox ima t e s  some 
naturally  occur r ing ma rket  thus Implying tha t the purpo s e  i s  
s imul a t ion. Th is  tes t negl e c ts the  fact  t ha t  one o f  the  p r ima cy 
mod es o f  l e a r n ing is by  mod el  r e.i ecL J on .  The l a bo r a to ry envi ron-
ments p rovide  a n  a rena w i th in wh ich the relat ive accuracy o f  
comp e t i ng general theo r i es can b e  eva l ua ted and the poo r e c  mod e l s  
rej ect ed. Reca l l , general theo r i e s  and mod e l s  o f  marke t s  mus t  
apply to a l l  s pecial  cases  i nd ependently o f  how those s p ecial cases 
compare with some o ther comp l i ca ted spec i a l  cas e  wh ich could J t sel f be 
the resul t of s evecal a c c id en t s  of h i s tory .  I n  e s s enc e ,  t h e  tes t 
denies the r e l evance o f  a s tudy o f  special cases and, i f  a p p l ied 
r igorou s ly , i t  would r e f l ec t as nega t ively on exper imenta l  me thods o f  
phy s i c a l  sc i ences a s  i t  would o n  exper imental economics. 
The p ro b l em of relevance can sur face in many d i f f erent 
f o rms. In the rema i n ing paragraphs four of the mos t  common sources 
of s kep t ic ism w i l l  b e  d i scussed. 
The f i rs t  a rgumen t i s  a c l a im tha t " r eal " bus i nessmen do  
no t b ehave a s  d o  the subj e c t s  in these  exper imen ts. S ta t ed l i ke this  
the  a rgument  i s  no t a cr i t i cism of  experimen t a l  method s , it  is a 
hypo thesis  about  b ehavior in d i f ferent  s ubj ect  poo l s  and is t hus a ca l l  
f o r  mor e  exper imen ts  (w i th bus ines smen subj ec t s ) .  S imila r l y ,  a r gument s  
t ha t  the  mone t a ry amoun t s  Involved w e r e  too l i t tl e  ( o r  t o o  much )  a r e  
s imply d emands fo r mo r e  exper imen ts. T h e  fac t o f  t he ma t t e r  Ls , 
however , that  a va r ie ty o f  sub j ec t s  and payment  l evels have been used . 
The Hong and P l o t t  (19 7 7 )  s t ud y ,  for  exampl e ,  u s ed employed 
ad u l t s .  To date,  no subj ec t poo l d i f ferences have been repo rt ed . 
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The nex t three argument s  derive f rom the fact that  naturally 
occu r r ing phenomena are inheren tly  mor e compl ex than a re l a bo ratory 
proces ses . The f i r s t  argument is that the l aboratory env i ronment i s  
ar t i f ic ia l , Exa c t l y  why is no t ar t icu l a t ed bu t w i th t h i s  argument the 
wo rd i s  u s ed many t imes and p referably l o ud l y .  I t  p robabl y res u l ts  f rom 
a ges tal t view tha t  there are so many impo r tan t i I I h f var a i  es t at t 1ey
canno t be enumerated and tl1at ti i t i iey n eract n ways tha t are necessar i l y  
precluded i n  the l abora tory . 
Th is  a rgument , no t ice, ls no t a n  argument against experimental 
methods in econom ics , it is  an argument aga ins t experimental  metho d s  
in general . The phys ica l scient i s ts mus t d ea l  w i t h  i t  and so mus t the
econom is t s . S i nce the asser t ion canno t be fal s i f ied , the onl y answer 
l ies in ex per imental wo rk that has been hel p f u l  in generat ing success ful 
models  and po ints o f  v i ew r egard ing mo re  compl ex p rocesses . As appl ied 
researchers f ind the data  f rom exp e r iments useful  in shaping their own 
hypn theses and bel i e f s ,  this argument becomes l es s  impo r ta n t .  
The second argument is  more speci f ic i n  that i t  no tes that 
na tural l y  o ccu r r ing p rocesses do no t occur in isolation .  Indus t r i es 
are embed d ed in a l arger soc i a l  co ntex t .  Businessmen have social 
relat ions h i ps and f r i endsh i ps .  They al so know that their  d ecis ions 
wh i l e  w i t h  one f irm may af f ect their  pos s i b i l i t i es fo r changing f irms . 
Th is  argument sugges ts that behav io r  in very compl ex 
env i ronmen ts may fol l ow d i f ferent l aws t han those wh ich govern 
behavior in rela t ively simpl e s i tuat ions . Th i s  is an excell ent reason 
for being car e f u l  in any a t t empt to ex trapo l ate  behavior f rom a 
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l abo ra tory t o  a cnmpl ex lndus t ry .  Not i c e ,  however , tha l L t  is  not an 
a rgument agains t ex perimental me thods . I t  is an a r gument fnr a par t icu l ar 
type o f  experiment--one in wh ich the complex i ty o f  Lhe exper imental 
env i ronment is  gradua l l y  inc reased similar to those o f  a g lven i ndu s t r y .  
I f  compl i cat ions d es t roy the app l ica b i l i t y o f  mo del s ,  i t  might be  poss ihl e 
tn ident i f y  the p recise  com p !  icat ions wh ich  cause the pro h l  em and adj us t· 
the model acccJL·d i ngl y .  I n  a sense this  p ro g ram o f  increas ing complex ity  
is  exac t l y  how ex per iments are  proceed i ng .  
The f inal cr i t icism a l so r el ies o n  the compl ex i ty o f  na t u ra l l y  
o ccu r r ing p rocesses . How i s  one t o  know i f  the el as t ici ty o f  demand 
and cos ts used in an exper iment o r  i f  the par t icu l ar ma rket  i ns t i t u t ion 
are those o f  the indus try?  I f  the resul t s o f  the laborato ry exper imen ts 
are to be app l ied ,  shoul d n ' t these be "r ight" ? The answe r  to these 
types of cr i t ic i sms are s t i l l  more exper iments under varying parame t e r s .  
Wi th a w i d e  range o f  parameters ex plo red , the ques t ion co l l apses into a 
J ud gment abou t panimeters and not the exper imental method s .  
A l l  o f  these argumen ts should make one cau t ious abou t 
ex t rapo l a t ing resul ts  generated f rom l abo ratory processes to nat ural ly 
occu r r i ng p rocesses . TI1 i s  type o f  extens ion mus t  be d ea l t w i t h  
ar t full y  i n  t h e  phys ical sciences as well a s  in eco nomics , I t  i s  
the mo s t  d i f f icul t task that any research e r  f aces . Experiments are 
s impl y an add i t ional source of data and experience that one adds to 
o t her sources in mak ing j ud gments abou t  how the wo rld wo r ks .  
An eas i er task invol v es a somewhat negat ive app roach placing 
the burden o f  p roo f o n  tho s e  who advoca te  theo r i es .  General theo ries 
app l y  i n  s peci a l  cases . They shoul d therefore be expec ted to wo rk in 
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the s impl e laboratory environments a nd if t hey d o  no t o r  i f  a comp e l ing 
t heo ry wo rks b e t t e r ,  the burden of p ro o f  is o n  the  advoca t e  to tell  us 
exa c t ly why we should no t j udge him to b e  wrong . Dy a do p t ing this  po i n t  
o f  view, r esearchers c a n  u s e  d a t a  f rom laboratory economics to reduce 
the size of the set of comp e ting  idea s .  
V I I .  CLO S ING REMARKS 
Exper imental  s tud ies d emons t r a t e  c l ea r l y  tha t market  ins t it u t ions 
and prac t ices can i n f l uence marke t performance . Variables t ra d i t iona lly 
c l ass i f ied as  aspec t s  o f  indu s t rial  s t ruc ture are  also o f  demons t rable 
i mpor tance . Fu rthermore , rather s tandard mathema t ical models are able t o  
c a p t u r e  much of  wha t c a n  be observed behavl orall y . 
Three mod el s do wel l in pred ic t ing mar k e t  pr ices  and quan t i ty : 
the compe t i t iv e  equ il ibr ium , the Courno t model , and the monopo l y  ( j o i n t  
maximi za t .  i o n )  mod el . Some t endency ex is ts f o r  t h e  error o f  a mod el to 
be sen s i t iv e  to s truc tural and ins t i t u t io nal var iables ( e . g . , p o s t ed 
pr ices t end to be h igher than prices under oral double auc tions)  h u t  
generally speaking , when a model appl ies , i t  does s o  w i t h  r ea sonabl e 
accurac y . 
In teres t ingly enough , whil e experimen t a l  s tud i es d emons tra t e  
t ha t  i t  is  poss ibl e t o  mod el economic processes , they have a l so u ncovered 
a problem in d e t ermining the  cond i t ions under wh ich a model will  be 
appl icabl e .  Th ere i s  an in terac t io n  b e tween var iables wh ich  has no t 
been fully  expla ined . I t  is no t the  case  tha t comp e t i tors  are  capable 
of collu s ive ac t iv i ty when merely r ecogni z ing a harmony of i n t er es t s .  
I t  i s  also no t t h e  case tha t compet i tors  canno t collude i n  t h e  abs enc e 
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o f  d irect  commun lca t ion and t h e  enforcement o f  agreemen t s .  Comp e t i tors 
1 0  seem to h e  wil l ing to collude ( so the r iva l i s t ic hypo theses advanced 
in the early  experimen tal s tud i es can be safely d ropped ) bu t some 
ind u s t r ial  s t ruc tut·es and ma rket ins t i t u t ions ma ke it easy wh ile o thers 
make it almo s t  impossible ( i n the sense tha t successful collus ion has 
!lever been observed ) . Even a monopol i s t  has d i f f iculty  w i t h i n  c e r t a i n  
market  ins t i tu tions . Exis t ing theory does no t tell us exac tly why this  
occu r s , bu t the  da ta  sugges t t ha t one  key is  the  behavior o f  the buyers . 
The da ta also sugg e s t  t ha t mar ket  per formance is very frag i l e  (or  
" no nl in ear")  with r espec t to und erlying s true  tural  and ins t i  tu t io nal 
va r iables and tha t " sl igh t"  changes ( f rom four  to two f i rms , o r  f rom 
price pos ting to some o ther ins t i t u t io n )  can switch a ma r ke t  from 
"compe t i t ive" to "col l u s ive" or  v i c e  versa . 
Exi s t ing resu l t s  and m ethods l ead naturally to q u e s t ions 
of  fu ture r esu l t s a nd appl ica t io ns . Research des igned to s tudy ma rket  
i ns t i tu t ions thought  to have an i n f luenc e o n  market  behavior is c er tainly 
in  the  realm o f  fea s i b il i t y .  Mod ern theories  are r ich with implica tions 
abou t pa r t icular fea tures of mar k e t  i ns t i tu t ions wh ich might increase 
o r  d ecrease the tendency for  comp e t i t ive b ehavio r .  For exampl e ,  
almo s t  all  o l igopo l y  theo r ies imp l y  t ha t  some form o f  po t e n t ial  
r e t a l ia t i < • n  is necessa r i l y  a f ea tu r e  o f  ins t i tu t ions whi c h  facil i ta t e  
a r educ t io n  in  compe t i t io n .  I f  t he S t o ec ker resu l ts are r epl icable ,  
t hen h is d es i gn ( po s t ed p r ic e  duo po l y  wi th experienced subj ec ts)  
mod i f ied by allowing the same two comp e t i tors  to meet o nl y  once and 
for o nl y  one period seems to provide a s e t t ing i n  which this com on 
theo r e t ical imp l ic a t io n  ( t he necess i ty fo r po t en t ia l  r e ta l ia t ion)  can 
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be  rej ec t ed .  I f  ind iv iduals were observed co l l ud ing a s  one wou l d  
expec t f r om t h e  S to ecker r esul t s  but in  a dd i t io n  w i tho u t  t h e  exis t enc e 
o f  po tential re tal i a t ions , then much r e th inking o f  o l igopoly theory
would b e  necessary . 
A bet ter und ers tand ing o f  the rol e  o f  s truc ture mus t  a l so b e  
emphasized . Theories  can d i f f er about r o l es o f  exc ess capac i t y ,  symm e t ry 
in cos ts , lumpiness o f  d emand , and the s i ze d is tr ibu t io n  o f  buyers and 
sel l e r s .  Ins t i tu t ions wh ich fac il i ta te p r ic e  comp e t i t io n  under some 
mar ke t  s t ruc tures may a c tually decr ease compe t i t io n  in  o thers . Ex is t ing 
theo r ies are f requ ently no t worked o u t  in s u f f ic ie n t  pa ramet r ic d e ta il 
to sugges t the po in ts a t  which such "cr i t ical  po i n ts" migh t exis t ,  The 
reason for  the l a c k  of theo r e t ical d evelopment is  a l ow benef i t/cos t 
ra t io fo r theo r i s ts who correctly  suspec t tha t f ield da ta appro p r ia t e  
for tes t i ng such a wor ked o u t  theory will  never ex ls t .  The po ssible  
existence o f  exper imen tal d a ta prov id es a n  inc e n t iv e  for theo r i s t s  to 
wo r k  w i th s tructural mod el s  a t  a lower l evel o f  a b s t rac t io n  and in mo r e  
opera t io nal t erms . 
Cond i t ions o f  entry , adver t i s ing , and decl i ning costs can 
al l be incorpora t ed i n to exper iment s .  W i th the r e c en t  d evelopmen t o f  
mul t i ple marke t exp e r iments i t  may b e  po ss ible t o  undertake experimen ts 
w i th product qual i ty a nd no nprice comp e t i t io n .  
Ma ny theo r i es ex i s t  in  t h e  f i e l d  o f  indu s t r in l  organiza t io n  
wh ich have no t been r educed to a s tanda rd s e t  o f  ax ioms o r  pr inc i ples 
a nd are  thus o n l y  t enta t ively accep ted (at bes t )  by 11111 rh  of  the pro f es s io n .  
Fo r examp l e ,  i nd i r ec t i nd ic es o f  comp e t i t io n  ( s ha r e  vn l a t i1 i ty ,  nature  
o f  Jn - i c e  movemen t s ,  e tc , )  mus t be rel i ed upon in  f ie l d  s l tua t lons
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because mnrg ina1 costs and t h e  ma rket d emand func tion  are s imp l y  no t 
ob serva bl e .  O f  course , in  a n  exp e r imen ta l set t i ng the d eg r e e  o f
comp e t i t io n  i s  easy t o  mea s u r e  because a l l  cos t s ,  pr ices , a nd o ther 
pa rame t ers are known. Thus , experimenta l markets can  pro v i d e  some 
experi ences with  the mea n ing and behavior of Ind irec t ind ices under  
c ircums tances tha t are  reasonably well  unders tood .  S im il a r l y , the 
evo l u t io n  of ins t i tu tions t hemselves is  of substant ial impo r tance .  
Wha t type  o f  mar k e t  ins t i tu t io nal env ironment m ig h t  one 
expec t fo r a g iven indus trial  s truc ture? The data sugges t the 
nonneu tra l l ty of  the marke t ing prac tices so one migh t expec t tha t 
s el f - in t e r es ted ind iv iduals  who r ea l i ze the r ela t ionships a nd have an 
oppo r tu n i ty to a f fec t mar ke t  i ns t i tu t ions wou l d  do so . To t h e  ex ten t 
tha t market ins t i tu tions a r e  par t  o f  marke t cond uc t ,  ind u s tr ial 
organiza t io n  economis ts have a cl ear interes t  in this ques t io n .
Perhaps t h e  r eason tha t th i s  i s s u e  has no t been addr essed experimen tally 
r e f l e c t s  the fac t tha t the ind ependen t in f lu ence of ins t i tu t io ns is  
only now being r ea l i zed . No doubt  this  void wil l be f il l ed a s  theo ry i s  
is  d ev e l o ped which will  sugges t  wha t one should l o o k  for i n  a nd J pmand 
f rom an exper imen tal  env i ro nmen t .  
No doubt the ul t im a t e  usefulness o f  experimen ta l wo rk wi l l  
be determined by d emo n s t ra t i o ns that exper iments p rovide ins i ghts  about  
wha t one f inds upon c lo s e  exa m i na t io n  o f  i ndust r ies . Pro secu tors and 
regu l a to r s  mu s t  choose wh ich  cases to prosecute  and wha t r e l i e fs  to 
pursue and f r equently the c ho ic es mus t be based o n  very thin  data  and 
controversia l economic theo r Le s .  The fac ts which might fa l s i f y  the 
theo ry are o f ten i mposs Lble  to o b ta i n  w i tho u t  und er tak ing the l u ng 
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and expens iv e process o f  l i t iga tion.  Exp er imen ts a r e  an al terna t i v e ,  
r el a t ively inexpensive , a nd rela t ively q u i c k  source o f  d a ta .  How 
these d a t a  will be r egarded by the courts  is y e t  ta be d e te rmined 
( Kirkwood 1981 ) b u t  there seems to  b e  no subs tantial d i f f e r ence 
be tween d a ta f rom experimen tal markets and da ta f rom o ther types o f  
exper imen ts . The fac t tha t expe r iments can always b e  rerun and the 
val id i ty of cla ims c hecked , places severe cons t ra ints  upon those 
who might enter such d a ta as ev i d ence in a cou r t  proc eed ing . 
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APPENDIX 
The i n s t r u c t ions below are typical of those used in the 
exper ime n t s  reviewed . Both pos t ed bid  marke t and oral  doub l e  
a u c t ion organ i za tions a r e  i ncluded . These instruct ions are read 
by the exper iment e r .  The incen t ive forms ( F i gure 2)  are a l so 
d is tr i bu ted . The fo rms are also  reproduced on the b l ac kboard 
and comp l e t ed by the experimen t er as d irected by the i n s t r u c tions 
and t he e x amp le in t he instruct ions . 
I NSTRUCTIONS 
GENERAL 
This is an experimen t in the economics o f  marke t decision 
making . V arious research found a t ions have provided funds f o r  this 
re search . The i n s t ru c t ions are simple and i f  you fol l ow them 
carefully and make good decisions you migh t earn a cons iderabl e  
amount o f  money which w i l l  b e  paid to  y ou in cash . 
I n  this  expe riment we are going t o  s imulate  a marke t in 
which some of you wil l be buyers and some o f  you will  b e  sellers i n  
a sequence o f  ma rke t d a y s  o r  t rading periods . At tached to  the 
i nstructio ns you will f ind a sheet , labeled B uyer or Seller , which 
d escribes t he value t o  y ou of any decis ions you migh t make . YOU ARE 
NOT TO Rt"'VEAl, TH I S  INFORNATION TO ANYON E .  I t  is you r own p riva t e  
informa t io n . 
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SPECIFI C  INSTRUCT I ONS TO BUYERS
During each marke t period you a re f ree to  purchase f rom any 
seller or sellers as many uni t s  as you might want . For the f i r s t  
unit  t h a t  you b u y  _c_!_t1!�r!g .'.! t rad in_g_ period you w l ll rec eive the amoun t
l i s t ed in row ( 1 )  ma rked � u n i t  redempt ion va l ue ;  i f  you buy a 
sec ond unit  you wil l receive the add i t ional amoun t l i s ted in row ( 5 )  
marked 2nd un i t  redempt it� _l!'a lue ; e t c .  The pro f i t s  f rom each  purchase 
(wh i ch are yours t o  keep) are computed b y  t aking the d i f fe rence 
be tween the redemp t ion value and purchase price o f  the uni t bough t .  
Under n o  cond it ions � � � � unit  for � price wh ich exceeds the 
redemp t i ori valu e .  J n  addit ion to  this  p ro f i t  you wil l receive a 5 cent 
c ommission for each purchas e .  Tha t is 
[ yo u r  earnings = 
(redemp t i on value) - (purchase price) + 0 . 05 corrnnission ] . 
Suppose for examp l e  tha t you b uy two units  and that  your 
redempt ion va l u e  for  the f irst  uni t i s  $ 2 00 and for the second uni t 
is $ 1 80 .  I f  you pay $ 1SO f o r  y ou r  f i r s t  unit  and $160 for t h e  se cond 
uni t , your earnings a r e :  
$ earnings f rom 1 s t  
$ earnings f rom 2nd  
total  $ earnings 
200 - ISO + 0 . 0 5  
1 80 160 + o . o s  
SO . OS 
20 . 0S 
SO . OS + 2 0 . 0S  = 7 0 . 10 
The b l anks on the t ab l e  will  help you record your pro f i t s . The purchase 
p r ice of the f i rst  u n i t  you buy during the f i r s t  period shou ld be 
recorded on row ( 2 )  a t  _t:_l� t ime of �chase . Y ou should then record 
the profits  on this  purchase as d i rected on rows ( 3 ) and ( 4 ) . At the 
end o f  the period r ecord the total of p ro f i t s  and commi ssions on the 
last  row ( 4 1 )  on the  page . Subsequent periods should be recorded 
s im il a r l y .  
SPECIFIC  INSTRUCTIONS TO S ELLERS 
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During  each marke t p e r iod you a r e  f ree t o  sell  t o  any buyer 
or buyers as  many units as  you might wan t .  The f irs t un i t  that  you 
sell  dur ing � _trad ing pe rio d  y o u  ob tain a t  a c o s t  o f  the amoun t l i s ted 
o n  the  a t t ached sheet  i n  the  row (2)  marked cos t � 1 s t  uni t ;  if  you
sell  a second u n i t  you incur the cos t  lis ted  i n  the  row (6 )  ma rked
cost of the 2nd uni t ;  e t c .  The p ro f i t s  f rom each sale (wh ich are  yours 
to keep) are comp u t e d  by taking the d i f fe rence b e tween the p r ice a t  
wh ich you sold t he unit  and t he cos t o f  t he uni t .  Under no cond i t i ons 
to this p r o f i t  you will rece ive a 5 cent  c ommiss ion f o r  each sale . 
Tha t  i s  
[ your earnings 
( sa le price of uni t )  - ( co s t  o f  uni t) + (0 . 05 conITTission ) ] .
Your t o t a l  p r o f i t s  and commiss ions f o r  a t ra d i n g  pe r iod , 
wh i c h  a r e  yours to keep , a re c ompu t ed b y  add ing up the prof i t  and 
commissions on sales  made dur i ng the trading p e r io d .  
Suppos e ,  f o r  examp l e ,  your cos t o f  the ] s t u n i t  i s  $ 1 40 and 
your cost of the second uni t is $ 1 60 .  For i l lus t r a t ive p u rposes we 
wi 1 1  cons ider on l y  a two-un i t  case . I f  you s e l l  the  f i rs t  u n i t a t  
$ 200 end the s econd uni t e t  $ 190 , your earn ings o r e : 
$ earn i ng s  f rom 1 s t  200 1 40 + 0 . 0 5 60 . 0 5 
$ e a rn ings from 2nd 1 90 1 60 + 0 . 05 ')() . 0 5  
t o  La l $ earn i ngs 60 . 0 5 + 30 . 0 5 = 90 . 10 
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The b lanks o n  t h e  tab l e  w i l l  help you record you r prof i ts .  The sa l e  
p ri c e  o f  t he f i rs t  un i t  you sell  during  the 1s t period shou ld be 
recorded on row ( 1 ) _<!_� i_!i_� _t ime � '3a ie . You shou l d  then record the 
p ro f i ts on t h i s  sale as d i rec ted on rows ( J) and ( 4 ) . At the end of
the pe riod record t he total  of p r o f i t s  and commi ss ions on the  las t  
row ( 4 1 )  o n  t he page , Subsequen t p e r i ods shou ld be reco rded s imi l a r l y .  
MARKET ORGAN IZATION ( Pos ted B i d  Ins t i t u t ions) 
The ma rk e t  for  this commodi t y  is organized as f o l l ows : we 
open the  marke t for  each t ra d ing day . Each buyer decides on a purchase 
p ri c e  which he will write on one o f  the ca rds p rovided . The buyers 
will h e  g iven two minu t es to submi t their p r ices . The cards wil l he 
collec ted and the  p rices wri t ten on the b lackboard , Sellers  w i l l  then 
be f r ee to make o f fers to s e l l  wh a t ever q uan t i t ies they d e s i re and to 
s p e c i f y  the buyer t o  whom t hey wish to s e ll . Of fers will  be made as  
follows : a seller  will  be chosen us ing random numbers , and will  s ta t e  
t h e  q ua n t i ty h e  wi shes t o  s e ll and the buye r t o  whom h e  w i shes t o  sel l .  
The buyer  w il l  then accept any  p a r t  o f  the selle r ' s  o f fe r  b y  s t a t ing 
t he quant i t y  he w ishes to buy . Howeve r ,  when a b uy e r  pos t s  a p r i c e ,  
h e  mus t  be  p repa red _l:_<J_ � a t leas_t_ si_i:i_c_:_ unit_ .  I f  t h e  f i rs t  buyer wH l 
not  p u rchase a ll uni. t s  the se l le r  wan t s  to sell , the sel l e r  i s  f ree t o  
choose a s econd buye r ,  a n d  so o n .  
When t he f i rs t  seller  has  mnde a l l  h is cont rac t s , nno the r 
s e l l e r  w i l l be se l ec ted a t  random and he w i l l  make h i s  d e s i red 
purcha ses . The prncess w i l l  he c on t i nued un t il there ore no n f fers  to 
se l J .  Th i s  cnrnp l P t Ps the t rad i ng day.  We w l l  J reopen the ma rket for
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a new t t·ading day by having buyers subm i t  new p r ices and t h e  p rocess 
will be repea t e d . Except  for the o f fers  and t he i r  acceptance you are  
no t t o  speak to any o t her subj ec t .  You a re f ree t o  make a s  much 
prof i t  as you can . 
Are there any ques t ions?  
MARKET ORGANIZATION (Oral  Doubl e  Auc t ion)  
The market for th is  commo d i t y  i s  organized as follows : we 
open the market f o r  a trad ing p e r iod (a  t rading "day") . The period
lasts  f o r  min u t e s .  A n y  buy e r  (seller)  i s  f r ee a t  any t ime during 
the per iod , t o  raise  his  hand and make a verbal b id ( o f fe r )  to b u y  
(sell)  one uni t  o f  the conunodi t y  a t  a specif ied p r i c e .  Th e b id ( o f fer) 
mus t  be h igher ( lowe r )  t han the o u t s t anding b id ( o f fe r )  should one 
exi s t .  Any sel ler (buyer) i s  f re e  at any t ime t o  accept or  not accept  
the b id ( o f f er )  of  any buyer  ( s e l l e r ) . If  a b id ( o ffer)  is  acc e p t ed 
a b inding cont ract  has been closed f o r  a sing l e  uni t  a nd the buyer 
and seller will record the con t r a c t  price to  be i n c l uded in  t heir 
earn ings . Any t i e s  i n  bids o r  accep tances will  be resolved by a 
random choice o f  buyer o r  sel ler . Except  f o r  the b ids ( o f f e r s )  and 
the i r  acce ptance you a re not to  speak to any other subj ec t .  Ther e  
a re l i ke l y  to  b e  many b i ds a n d  o f fers  tha t a r e  not ac cepted , b u t  
y o u  a re f r ee to  keep t ry i ng , and as  a b u y e r  or  a s e l l e r  you a r e  f re e  
to m,1 ke as  much p 1· o f i t a s  y o u  can . 
/\ re the re a ny q u es l i o n s ?  
FOOTNOTES 
1 .  The s ingle exception  i s  a n  expe r imen t r epo r t ed i n  Sm i th ( 1 . 98 ) ) ,
2 .  A po s s ib l e  exampl e w i th i n  the f r amewo r k  r ev i ewed i n  t h is paper 
i s  explo red in Cohen, Levine , and Plo t t  ( 1 97 8 ) . The case is  
one  i n  which the subj ects  in  a commi t t e e  exper imen t evidently
though t they  were  to prov ide i ns igh ts for  marke t ing s tra teg i es 
and igno r ed the inc entive sys tem. 
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3. No t ic e  tha t wi tho u t  a comm i ssion the ma rginal trades under the
c o nd i t ions of F igure 3 may no t b e  made .  Ther e a r e  no gains f rom
a n  exchange of the third u n i t  of o ne and three for examp l e .
4 .  This s tudy i nvol ved a s l ight var ia n t  o f  the o ral dou b le auc t i o n .  
B id s  a n d  o f fers were l e f t  o p e n  u n t i l  a c c ep ted o r  c hanged . Thus 
the market  ins t it u t ions were s imilar to a double o ra l  auc t io n  
w i t h  l im i t  orders a n d  a n  open boo k.  
5 .  I n  s t i l l  ano t h er s tudy (Plo t t  and Wild e 1 981 ) sellers a s  a group
( four sel l e r s )  knew they could c o l1 ec t ivel y increase d emand in 
the same sense that phys i c  lans , au tomo b i l e  mechan ics , a nd o t her 
pro fess ional s c a n  i n f l u ence d emand . The d a t a  g i ve no suppo r t  a t  
a l l  f o r  c o l l u s i o n  model s .  
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6 .  Informa t i o n  i n  Oo lbear , e t  al . d id no t have a measurabl e ef f ec t .  
Subsequent exper iments sugges t tha t the payo f fs used i n  this 
expe r �nent were so small ( f iv e  cents d i f f erenc e in pro f i ts b e tween 
Courno t equ il ibr ium and mo nopoly)  that the in fluence of any va r lables 
would be hard to d e t ec t .  Never thel ess , the d a ta t end to b e  very 
close and j u s t  above the Cou rno t equ i l ib r ium nnd the q ual i t a t iv e  
i n f l u ence o f  o ther variables is  cons istent  w i t h  tho s e  o f  l a ter 
s tud i es .  
7 .  The Federal Trad e Comm is s ion comp la in t  aga ins t E thy l ,  DuPo n t ,  PPG 
and Nalco Chemical Company ( Ethyl Corpo r a t i o n ,  e t  a l . Docket  No . 9 1 28) . 
8 .  The prod u c t  i s  added t o  gasol ine b y  r e f i ners to reduce knock  and 
raise  gaso l ine o c tane r a t ing.  
9 .  S e e  Plo t t  ( 1 9 7 9) for  a d e ta il ed d iscussion.  
1 0 .  This hypo thesis mainta ined t ha t  compet i tors  will  a t t emp t to maximize 
r el a t ive p ro f i t s  ther eby trans forming the market into a z ero sum 
game . 
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